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1. Introduction 
In the last ten to fifteen years financial derivative securities have become 
an important,  and controversial,  product.1 These securities are powerful 
instruments  for transferring and hedging  risk. However,  they also allow 
agents to quickly and cheaply take speculative risk. Determining whether 
agents  are hedging  or speculating  is not  a simple  matter because  it is 
difficult to value  portfolios  of derivatives.  The relationship  between  risk 
and derivatives  is especially  important in banking,  since banks dominate 
most  derivatives  markets and,  within  banking,  derivative  holdings  are 
concentrated  at a few large banks.  If large banks are using derivatives  to 
increase  risk, then  recent losses  on derivatives,  such as those  of Procter 
and Gamble and of Orange County, may seem small in comparison  with 
the losses  by banks.  If, in addition,  the major banks are all taking similar 
gambles,  then the banking system  is vulnerable.  This paper is the first to 
estimate  the market-value and interest-rate sensitivity  of bank derivative 
positions.  We focus on a single important derivative security, interest-rate 
swaps,  and find evidence  that the banks, as a whole,  take the same side in 
interest-rate  swaps.  The  banking  system's  net  position  is  somewhat 
interest-rate  sensitive.  Relatively  small  increases  in  interest  rates  can 
cause fairly large decline in the value of swaps  held by banks. However, 
Thanks  to Ben Bernanke,  Peter Garber, Julio Rotemberg,  Cathy Schrand,  and  especially 
Greg Duffee  for comments  and suggestions. 
1. A large number of reports by government  and trade organizations  have been devoted  to 
studying  derivatives.  See  Bank for International  Settlements  (1992), Bank of England 
(1987, 1993), Basle Committee  on Banking Supervision  (1993a, b, c, d), Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve  System  et al. (1993), Commodity  Futures Trading Commis- 
sion  (1993), Group of Thirty (1993a, b, 1994), House  Banking Committee  Minority Staff 
(1993), House  Committee  on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1993), U.S. Comptrol- 
ler of the Currency (1993A, B), and U.S.  Government  Accounting  Office (1994). 300 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
our evidence  suggests  that swap positions  are largely hedged  elsewhere 
in bank portfolios. 
Derivative  securities are contracts that derive their value from the level 
of an underlying  interest  rate, foreign  exchange  rate, or price.  Deriva- 
tives  include  swaps,  options,  forwards,  and futures.  At the end of 1992 
the notional amount  of outstanding  interest-rate swaps was $6.0 trillion, 
and the outstanding  notional amount of currency swaps was $1.1 trillion 
(Swaps Monitor (1993)). U.S. commercial banks alone held $2.1 trillion of 
interest  rate swaps  and $279 billion of foreign-exchange  swaps  (Call Re- 
ports of Income  and Condition). Moreover, derivatives are concentrated in a 
relatively  small number of financial intermediaries.  For example,  almost 
two-thirds  of swaps  are held by only 20 financial intermediaries.  Of the 
amount  held  by  U.S.  commercial  banks,  seven  large  dealer banks  ac- 
count for over 75%. 
An interest-rate  swap  is a contract under which  two parties exchange 
the net interest  payments  on an amount known  as the "notional princi- 
pal."  In the  simplest  interest-rate  swap,  at a series  of six-month  inter- 
vals,  one  party  pays  the  current  interest  rate  (such  as  the  six-month 
LIBOR) on the notional principal while its counterparty pays a preset,  or 
fixed, interest rate on the same principal. The notional principal is never 
exchanged.  By convention,  interest  rates in a swap  are set  so  that the 
swap  has  a zero  market  value  at initiation.  If there  are unanticipated 
changes  in interest rates, the market value of a swap will change, becom- 
ing an asset for one party and a liability for the counterparty. 
Valuing an interest-rate swap  requires information on when  the swap 
was  initiated  (or what  the fixed interest  rate is),  the terms of payment, 
and the remaining  maturity of the swap.  Firms are not required to reveal 
this information,  and few firms reveal even market values for their swap 
portfolios.2  Moreover,  it is  not  the  current market value  that  is  most 
important.  The key factor in determining  the risk of a swap  portfolio is 
the  interest-rate  sensitivity  of  the  portfolio.  Swap  value  can  be  very 
volatile.  If interest  rates change  slightly, the value of a swap can change 
dramatically. Thus,  monitoring  the risks from swaps  is difficult. Partially 
in response  to this, proposals  for reforming swap reporting require insti- 
tutions  to reveal  the interest-rate  sensitivity  of their swap  positions  (as 
well as sensitivities  to other factors such as foreign exchange rates). Until 
institutions  are required  to  report  the  interest-rate  sensitivity  of  their 
swap  portfolios,  swaps  are an  easy  way  to quickly  and  inexpensively 
alter  the  risk  of  a  portfolio.  Because  of  insufficient  current  reporting 
2. Starting in 1994, banks are required to report for interest rate, foreign exchange,  equity, 
and commodity  derivatives  the value of contracts that are liabilities as well as the value 
of contracts that are assets. Banks  and  Derivatives  *  301 
requirements,  swaps  can be used  to make it more difficult for outsiders 
to monitor risk. 
Difficulty  in  monitoring  risk is  especially  important  when  the  party 
entering  into a derivative  transaction such as a swap is an agent manag- 
ing  money  for outside  principals.  Whenever  outside  principals  cannot 
fully  monitor,  an  agent  may  find  it  optimal  to  speculate  (Dow  and 
Gorton,  1994). This means  that recent reports of losses  by Proctor and 
Gamble,  Gibson  Greetings,  Metallgesellschaft,  and  Orange  County 
may signal that agents,  whether  they are corporate treasurers or profes- 
sional  money  managers,  have  been  using  derivatives  to  speculate.3 
These  kinds  of losses  have  direct and  indirect impacts.  Principals and 
other  stakeholders  in  an  organization  hit  by  losses  obviously  suffer. 
There is also  a possible  indirect effect  through  signaling.  Since deriva- 
tives  are opaque,  a realized  loss by one  organization  may be viewed  as 
information  about  the portfolio  positions  of other organizations.  These 
effects  are the natural result of information release in an agency  setting. 
They  hold  true  for  corporations,  municipalities,  fund  managers,  and 
banks.  The  problems  from  derivatives  transactions  thus  come  from 
information  problems.  This points  out  the  need  for changes  in  either 
accounting  rules or investment  regulations. 
When banks use derivatives,  the problems are more severe.  There are 
two issues.  First, even  knowing  more about the derivatives  position  of a 
bank may not allow  outside  stakeholders  to determine  the overall riski- 
ness  of the bank.  Banks invest  in many nonderivative  instruments  that 
are illiquid and opaque.  Thus,  even  if the value of their derivative  posi- 
tions were known,  it would  be hard to know how subject to interest-rate 
and  other  risks  the  entire  bank  would  be.  This  makes  them  different 
from most  other organizations  that invest  in derivatives. 
Second,  bank failures can have  external effects.  The failure of several 
large banks can lead to the breakdown  of the payments  system  and the 
collapse  of credit markets for firms. These problems,  known  collectively 
as "systemic  risk," are of concern if large banks all take similar positions 
in derivatives  markets or are perceived  as taking similar positions.  It is 
clear that if banks  have  similar positions,  the  failure of one  bank may 
mean the failure of many. Because derivatives  are opaque,  even if banks 
have different positions,  outside  principals may not be able to determine 
whether  the failure of one bank signals trouble at other banks. 
Systemic-risk  issues  lead  us  to examine  banks.  We further focus  on 
interest-rate  swaps  because  interest-rate risk is nondiversifiable  and be- 
3. The  agents  in  these  examples  have  all claimed  that any  "speculative"  risk they  were 
taking in their derivative  positions  was unintentional. 302 * GORTON & ROSEN 
cause  banks  naturally  are repositories  of interest-rate  risk. Banks bear 
interest-rate risk if their assets  reprice at different frequencies  than their 
liabilities.  Banks may be using  interest-rate swaps  to hedge-that  is,  to 
reduce interest-rate  risk-or  to speculate.4 
To  estimate  interest-rate  sensitivity,  the  first  step  in  determining 
whether  there  is  systemic  risk, we  need  to put  more  structure on  the 
existing  data.  The  only  available  data  comes  from  the  Call Reports of 
Income and Condition, where  banks  report  notional  values,  a  number 
called  "replacement  cost,"  and  the  remaining  maturity  of interest-rate 
derivatives  (more  than  one  year remaining  and  less  than  one  year re- 
maining).  The  replacement  cost  of a bank's  interest-rate  derivatives  is 
the value  of the derivatives  that are assets  to the bank (not netting  out 
derivatives  that  are liabilities).  These  data are insufficient  to  calculate 
interest-rate  sensitivity,  or even  market value.  We make simple assump- 
tions  that allow  us to go from the available data to estimates  of market 
value  and interest-rate  sensitivity. 
Our estimates  of interest-rate  sensitivity  show  that the banking  sys- 
tem has a net swap  position  that falls in value if interest rates rise. This 
sensitivity  is  due  to the  positions  of large banks.  Small banks  tend  to 
have only minor exposure  to interest rates in their swap positions.  While 
our  estimates  show  that large banks  have  interest-rate-sensitive  swap 
positions,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  banks'  equity  positions  are 
interest-rate-sensitive  to the  same  extent.  The banks may use  swaps  to 
hedge  on-balance-sheet  interest-rate risk, or they may use other deriva- 
tives markets,  such as the futures market, to hedge  their swap exposure. 
We investigate  whether  swap  exposure  is  hedged  elsewhere  on  bank 
balance  sheets.  We  find  that  large  banks  have  mostly  hedged  swap 
interest-rate risk. This leaves  open the very important question  of who is 
acquiring the interest-rate risk from large banks. 
The paper  proceeds  as follows.  In Section  2 we  provide  some  back- 
ground on interest-rate swaps.  In Section 3, the role of banks in the swap 
market is discussed.  We discuss  several hypotheses  about bank involve- 
ment in the swap  market. Section 4 presents  the model that allows us to 
derive  market  value  and  interest-rate  sensitivity  from published  data. 
Section  5 outlines  the procedure  for calibrating the model.  Estimates of 
market value  and interest-rate sensitivity  are given  in Section 6. Section 
7 addresses  the question  of whether  banks hedge  their swap  exposure. 
Conclusions  are presented  in Section 8. 
4. Note  that  the  same  questions  arise  in  foreign-currency  derivatives,  but,  unlike  with 
interest-rate  derivatives,  there is no easy  way  to know  from a bank's currency deriva- 
tives position  whether  it is hedging  or speculating. Banks  and Derivatives *  303 
2.  Interest-Rate  Swaps:  Background 
2.1 DEFINITION  OF AN INTEREST-RATE  SWAP 
An interest-rate  swap  is a contract under which two parties agree to pay 
each other's interest obligations.  The cash flows in a swap are based on a 
"notional" principal which  is used  to calculate the cash flow  (but is not 
exchanged).  The  two  parties  are known  as  "counterparties."  Usually, 
one of the counterparties  is a financial intermediary. At a series of stipu- 
lated  dates,  one  party (the fixed-rate payer) owes  a "coupon" payment 
determined  by the fixed interest rate set at contract origination,  rN,  and, 
in return,  is owed  a "coupon"  payment  based  on  the relevant  floating 
rate, rt. For most swap contracts, LIBOR  is used as the floating rate while 
the fixed rate is set to make the swap  have an initial value of zero.5 The 
fixed  rate can be  thought  of as a spread  over the appropriate-maturity 
Treasury bond,  where  the spread can reflect credit risk. So, for example, 
a five-year  swap  might  set the fixed rate at the five-year Treasury bond 
rate plus  25 basis  points  and  the floating  rate at the six-month  LIBOR. 
When  the swap  is entered  into,  the fixed rate is set at rN, where  N is 
the origination  date of the swap.  The fixed-rate payer pays rNL, where  L 
is the notional  principal. The fixed-rate payer receives rtL,  where rt  is the 
interest  rate at the  last reset  date.  Notice  that the  notional  principal is 
never  exchanged.  At each  settlement  date  t, only  the difference  in the 
promised  interest  payments  is  exchanged.  So  the  fixed-rate  payer  re- 
ceives  (or pays) a difference  check: (rt -  rN)L. 
A swap  is a zero-sum  transaction.  While the initial value of a swap is 
zero,  over  the  life  of  the  swap  interest  rates may  change,  causing  the 
swap  to become  an asset  to one  party (the fixed-rate payer if rates rise) 
or a liability  (for the  fixed-rate  payer  if rates fall); clearly, one  party's 
gain is the  other's  loss.  For example,  if the floating rate rises from rt to 
rt, then  the difference  check received  by the fixed-rate payer rises from 
(rt -  rN)L to  (r; -  rN)L. 
Figure 1 provides  examples  of a swap.  We define a swap participant as 
"long" if the participant pays a fixed rate and receives a floating rate. The 
top panel shows  a bank with a long position.  The bank pays 7.15% to its 
counterparty  and receives  the six-month  LIBOR rate. So, if the notional 
principal is $1 million  and  payments  are made  every  six months,  then 
when  LIBOR is 6.5%, the bank pays a net of $3250 to its counterparty [$1 
million  x  (7.15% -  6.5%)/2]. When  LIBOR is 7.5%, on the other hand, 
the bank receives  $1750. Thus,  the bank gains  when  interest rates rise. 
5. The floating rate typically is reset every six months using the then current  six-month 
rate. Since the floating  rate  is determined  six months prior  to settlement,  throughout  the 
swap the cash flow at the next settlement  date is known six months in advance. 304 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
Figure  1 SWAP  EXAMPLES 
Bank  in Long Position: Pays Fixed  and Receives Floating 
Bank  in Short  Position: Pays Floating  and Receives Fixed 
Bank  in Hedged  Position 
The middle  panel  shows  the bank in a short position.  Notice  that we 
have  have  implicitly  assumed  that the bank is a dealer, since  the fixed 
rate it pays  is  10 basis  points  less  than  the  fixed  rate it receives.  This 
difference  is the dealer fee. When a bank has a short position,  it loses  if 
interest rates rise. 
The  last  panel  of  Figure  1 shows  the  bank making  both  "legs" of a 
swap.  The bank's position  is hedged,  since no matter how  interest rates Banks  and  Derivatives  ?  305 
move,  the bank receives  a net of 10 basis points  from the swap  (assum- 
ing no default). 
2.2 RISKS  IN SWAPS 
The major risks from swaps  include  those  that are common  to all fixed- 
income  securities.  Interest-rate  risk exists  because  changes  in  interest 
rates affect the value of a swap.  Also,  credit risk exists because a counter- 
party may default.  If a swap is a liability, then default by a counterparty 
is not costly. Also,  notional  principal is not exchanged  in a swap,  so the 
magnitude  of credit risk is reduced. 
To examine  interest-rate risk, we  need  to be able to value  swaps  as a 
function of interest rates. To do this we can view a swap as a combination of 
loans. The fixed-rate payer can be viewed  as borrowing at a fixed rate and 
simultaneously  lending  the same amount at a floating rate. For example, 
from the point of view of the fixed-rate payer, a five-year swap is equivalent 
to issuing  a five-year  coupon  bond  and buying  a five-year floating-rate 
obligation  (where  the floating rate is set such that the initial value of the 
exchange is zero). This helps us to value swaps subsequent  to their issue. 
For example, looking forward two years into the five-year swap, the fixed- 
rate payer  will  have,  in effect,  issued  a three-year coupon  bond  at the 
original five-year rate and will have bought a three-year floating-rate bond. 
At that point in time, the market value of the swap to the fixed-rate payer is 
the difference between  the value of a three-year bond issued then and the 
value of the initial five-year bond with three years left to maturity. 
To value  a swap,  let co  be the original maturity of the swap,  N be the 
date of origination,  and t be the date at which  we are valuing  the swap. 
Further, let the value at date t of a one-dollar (of principal) bond (i.e.,  L = 
1) issued  at N with  original maturity co  be FtN. Notice  that a floating-rate 
bond is always priced at par (ignoring the lagged reset). This allows us to 
represent  the value  of a swap with $1.00 of notional principal as 
Pt,  =  1  -  rtIN. 
Now  it is straightforward  to see how  the value of a swap changes  when 
interest  rates change.  As interest  rates move,  the value  of the bond,  F, 
changes  and  the  swap  value  is  altered  accordingly.  Describing  the 
change  in interest rates is, however,  more complicated,  since it requires 
a model  of the term structure of interest rates. 
To this  point  we  have  ignored  default.  The  effect  of  default  to  the 
holder of a swap depends  on whether  the swap is an asset or a liability at 
the time of default.  If a counterparty defaults but the swap is a liability to 
the  holder  (i.e.,  the  holder  is  making  payments  to  the  counterparty), 306 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
then  the holder  continues  to make payments  and there is no immediate 
effect.  If the  swap  is  an  asset,  however,  then  default  means  that  the 
counterparty  should  be making payments,  but does  not. The loss to the 
holder  is equivalent  to the value  of the swap  at that point.  The replace- 
ment cost of a swap is the loss that would be incurred if the counterparty 
defaulted.  Note  that replacement  cost is always  nonnegative,  since  de- 
fault by an asset holder implies  a zero loss to its counterparty. 
3.  Banks  and  Interest-Rate  Swaps 
3.1  SWAP POSITIONS OF BANKS 
Table 1 presents  a list  of the  top  swap  firms according  to the  notional 
value of interest-rate swap positions.  Most of these firms are commercial 
banks.  Five of the  top ten firms by notional  value  are U.S.  commercial 
banks,  three  are French state-owned  banks,  one  is a British bank,  and 
one is a U.S.  securities  firm. Moreover, eighteen  of the top twenty  firms 
Table  1  WORLD'S  MAJOR  INTEREST-RATE-SWAP  FIRMS 
(YEAR END 1992) 
Outstandings 
Rank  Firm  ($ billions) 
1  Chemical  Bank  $389.7 
2  J.P. Morgan  367.7 
3  Societe Generale  345.9 
4  Compagnie  Financiere de Paribus  342.7 
5  Credit  Lyonnais  272.8 
6  Merrill  Lynch  265.0 
7  Bankers Trust  255.7 
8  Barclays Bank  247.4 
9  Chase Manhattan  222.2 
10  Citicorp  217.0 
11  Bank of America  191.1 
12  Credit Agricole  181.7 
13  Banque Indosuez  174.1 
14  Banque Nationale  de Paris  160.1 
15  Westpac  147.8 
16  Salomon  Brothers  144.0 
17  Caisse des Depots  111.8 
18  First Chicago  74.8 
19  Bank of Nova  Scotia  73.8 
20  Banque  Bruxelles  Lambert  56.6 
Total of Top 20  4,241.9 
Source:  The World's  Major Derivative Dealers, Swaps  Monitor Publications (1993). Banks  and  Derivatives  *  307 
with  the largest swap  positions  are banks. These firms also tend to have 
large positions  in other derivatives  markets. 
Within the U.S. banking system,  swaps are concentrated in a few large 
banks.  Table 2 shows  the interest-rate swap  position  of U.S. commercial 
banks in the last decade.  Panel A, covering all commercial banks,  shows 
that  fewer  than  3% of  banks  have  any  swaps  at all.  Furthermore,  al- 
though  roughly  200 banks hold swaps,  over 75% of swap notional value 
is held  by seven  dealer banks  (panel B), and over 90% is held by thirty 
banks (panels  B and C).6 
In the  empirical  work  that follows,  we  restrict attention  to banking 
organizations  with  total assets  greater than $500 million.  Banks smaller 
than  this  generally  do  not  use  swaps,  and  account  for an insignificant 
portion  of  the  market.  Except  for the  very  largest  banks,  even  banks 
larger than $500 million in assets rarely hold significant amounts of swap 
notional  value  (see panels  D-F  of Table 2). Panels D-F  show  that swaps 
account  for a tiny fraction of total assets  at banks below  the top thirty. 
Table 2 also  shows  that the potential  risk to the banking  system  from 
swaps  is much  greater now  than  in the past because  of the  growth  in 
bank  swap  positions.  Over  the  period  1985-1993  swap  holdings  in- 
creased by 40% per year. The final two columns  of panel A show  that the 
growth  in swap notional value dwarfs the growth in assets and equity in 
the banking  system.  By the end of 1993 swap notional value was over 10 
times the total equity in the banking  system. 
The concentration  of swap holdings  at a small number of banks is not 
necessarily  a sign that swaps  increase risk in the banking system.  Swaps 
may allow  interest  rates to be transferred between  banks in such a way 
that overall bank failure risk is reduced.  Below, we show  how banks can 
manage risk using swaps.  Swap positions  may be hedged  in other deriva- 
tives markets or swaps  may be held to hedge  on-balance-sheet  positions. 
Another  possibility  is that the concentration  of swap  holdings  is linked 
to the incentives  of large banks to engage  in risky activities. If this is the 
case,  then swaps  may increase systemic  risk. 
3.2 BANK  LOANS  AND SWAPS 
We explore two hypotheses  about why  a few banks dominate  the swaps 
market.  One  possibility  is  that  banks  in  general  dominate  the  swaps 
market because  they face interest-rate risk as a by-product  of their busi- 
ness.  Swaps can be used  to manage this risk. The concentration among a 
few  banks  may  occur because  these  banks  specialize  in managing  the 
6. Dealer  banks  include  Bank  of  America,  Bankers  Trust,  Chase  Manhattan,  Chemical 
Bank, Citicorp, First National  Bank of Chicago,  and J. P. Morgan. Table 2  INTEREST-RATE SWAP POSITIONS OF U.S.  COMMERCIAL BANKS (YEAR END  1985-1993) 
% of Banks  Total Swap  Ratio of Swap  Ratio of Swap 
Number of  Engaged in  Notional Value  Notional Value to  Notional Value to Book 
Year  Banks  Swaps  ($ billion)  Total  Assets (%)  Value of Equity (%) 
Panel A: All Banks 
1985  11,035  1.4  186.15  6.9  111.2 
1986  10,516  1.7  366.63  12.6  204.3 
1987  10,174  1.8  715.50  24.0  399.3 
1988  9,792  1.9  930.41  29.9  477.2 
1989  9,521  1.9  1,349.32  41.2  664.8 
1990  9,284  2.0  1,716.78  51.1  793.4 
1991  9,180  2.2  1,755.85  51.2  765.6 
1992  8,833  2.2  2,121.97  61.0  813.3 
1993  8,596  2.3  2,946.26  80.2  1,003.0 
Panel B: Dealer Banks 
1985  7  100  137.31  22.8  424.7 
1986  7  100  279.81  43.7  781.0 
1987  7  100  559.08  86.9  1787.0 
1988  7  100  713.29  110.9  1995.2 
1989  7  100  1016.57  155.0  3123.8 
1990  7  100  1285.65  198.0  3682.1 
1991  7  100  1268.22  195.8  3531.7 
1992  7  100  1614.24  251.5  3742.6 
1993  7  100  2264.30  318.4  4461.8 
Panel C: Top 30 Banks Excluding Dealer Banks 
1985  23  100  31.50  3.8  70.2 
1986  23  96  61.49  7.0  128.4 
1987  23  96  110.17  12.5  232.1 
1988  23  96  152.43  17.1  303.7 
1989  23  100  233.68  23.7  417.2 
1990  23  100  305.42  29.6  496.9 
1991  23  100  348.53  34.0  548.6 
1992  23  100  364.33  34.9  482.6 
1993  23  100  494.06  45.6  591.7 Panel D: Banks With Total Assets Exceeding $5 Billion, but not in Top 30 Banks 
1985  57  96  11.82  2.6  43.8 
1986  57  96  15.36  3.1  52.2 
1987  59  97  32.65  6.3  109.1 
1988  59  97  39.46  7.0  115.5 
1989  59  97  43.03  7.2  118.0 
1990  59  97  56.51  9.0  151.0 
1991  60  97  65.80  10.8  166.1 
1992  61  97  80.10  12.4  175.0 
1993  59  97  115.79  16.8  221.5 
Panel E: Banks with Total Assets Between $1 Billion and $5 Billion 
1985  140  52  1.38  0.5  8.1 
1986  140  53  2.04  0.7  11.4 
1987  148  53  2.75  1.0  14.0 
1988  150  53  6.61  2.2  33.8 
1989  150  53  8.10  2.7  38.1 
1990  150  53  7.76  2.5  34.6 
1991  148  53  7.46  2.3  32.0 
1992  147  52  7.94  2.4  31.3 
1993  138  52  12.81  3.9  47.7 
Panel F: Banks with Total Assets Between $500 Million and $1 Billion 
1985  149  0.20  0.16  0.2  2.8 
1986  150  0.20  0.41  0.5  6.7 
1987  153  0.22  0.54  0.7  8.9 
1988  154  0.22  0.82  0.9  12.5 
1989  155  0.23  1.14  1.2  15.9 
1990  155  0.22  1.34  1.3  17.7 
1991  147  0.22  1.05  1.1  14.1 
1992  150  0.22  1.04  1.0  12.1 
1993  151  0.21  1.39  1.2  14.8 
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interest-rate risk for the entire banking system,  which they may hedge  in 
other  markets.  Another  possibility  is that regulatory  distortions  create 
an incentive  for large banks to absorb interest risk from other banks and 
from nonbank  firms, risk which  the large banks do not hedge. 
Traditionally, banks issued  fixed-rate loans because borrowers wanted 
certainty of payment.7  A fixed-rate loan involves  two risks to the bank. 
First,  the  borrower  may  default  (credit risk).  Second,  bank  portfolios 
contain  these  loans  plus  primarily floating-rate  (short-term)  liabilities. 
Thus,  if interest  rates change  after a loan contract has been  signed,  the 
value  of the portfolio  changes  (interest-rate risk). By holding  fixed-rate 
loans  and  floating-rate  liabilities,  the  bank  bears  both  credit  risk and 
interest-rate risk. 
Swaps  allow  the credit risk and interest-rate risk to be priced, traded, 
and  held  separately.  Banks  can  use  swaps  to  separate  credit risk and 
interest-rate risk in two ways.  Either a bank can issue a floating-rate loan 
to  a borrower,  who  then  swaps  to  fixed  with  a third  party  (possibly 
another bank).  In this case,  the bank is left with  floating-rate loans  and 
floating-rate liabilities.  Or the bank can issue  a fixed-rate loan and enter 
into  a pay-fixed,  receive-floating  swap  with  a third party, possibly  an- 
other bank. Again,  the bank ends  up effectively  receiving a floating rate 
on its loans.  Notice  that in both cases,  the third party is entering  into a 
swap  which  receives  fixed and pays  floating.  One  of the issues  we  dis- 
cuss  below  is whether  large banks  are the  third parties in these  swap 
transactions. 
Swaps  might allow interest-rate risk to be redistributed among banks, 
without  changing  the  level  of interest-rate  risk in banking.  Borrowers 
might borrow from one set of banks at floating rates but swap with large 
banks  to  hedge  interest-rate  risk.  Essentially  the  same  result  occurs  if 
borrowers  take  fixed-rate  loans  and  then  these  smaller  lenders  swap 
with large banks to hedge  the small banks' interest-rate risk. With either 
of  these  examples,  large banks  end  up  holding  unhedged  swap  posi- 
tions.  This would  leave  the  overall  risk in the  system  unchanged,  but 
more highly  concentrated. 
The interest-rate  risk at large banks depends  on whether  they  hedge 
the  risk transferred  from the  rest of the banking  system,  and whether 
they  choose  to absorb additional  interest-rate risk (by speculating).  The 
incentives  for large banks to hedge  interest-rate risk may be affected by 
the  regulatory  system.  Roughly  coinciding  with  the  existence  of  the 
7. Over  the  period  1977-1993,  approximately  40% (by value)  of commercial  loans  were 
floating  rate (Quarterly Terms  of Bank Lending survey,  Federal Reserve Board). There are 
no significant  trends in the relative use of floating-rate loans over this period,  overall or 
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swaps  market, large U.S. commercial banks have been (formally or infor- 
mally)  protected  by  the  policy  known  as  "too big  to  fail." Under  this 
policy  regulators  extended  deposit  insurance  at these  banks to cover all 
liability holders,  large or small. This serves as a subsidy  to risktaking by 
too-big-to-fail  banks.  This would  suggest  that big banks,  but not  small 
banks,  would  hold  large, unhedged  interest-rate swap positions.  To ad- 
dress  this  issue,  we  need  to  know  not  just  the  notional  positions  of 
banks,  but  whether  the  big  banks  that dominate  the  market have  net 
long or net short swap  portfolios,  and whether  they have hedged. 
4. Modeling  the  Market  Value  of Swaps 
In this  section  we  discuss  the  available  data and  outline  our empirical 
procedure for calculating the market values and interest-rate sensitivities 
of bank interest-rate  swap positions. 
4.1 DATA 
The data commercial banks are required to report to regulators are insuffi- 
cient to derive  either market values  or interest-rate sensitivities  without 
imposing  some assumptions.  There are three big problems with the data. 
First, banks do not report market values; instead they report only notional 
value,  something  called "replacement cost," and the fraction of interest- 
rate derivatives  with a remaining maturity of less than one year. Second, 
notional  value  is reported  separately  for interest-rate  swaps  and  other 
interest-rate-based  derivatives, but replacement cost and remaining matu- 
rity are reported only for the aggregate of all interest-rate derivatives with 
credit risk,  including  swaps,  forwards,  and  options  (but excluding  fu- 
tures). Finally, while banks were required to report notional value starting 
in the second  quarter of 1985, they were not required to report replace- 
ment cost and remaining maturity until the first quarter of 1990. Thus, we 
have only four years of quarterly observations  on replacement  cost. 
We have defined  notional value above. Replacement cost, according to 
the Call Report  instructions  to banks, is as follows: 
. . . the replacement  cost [is] the mark-to-market  value, for only those interest 
rate and foreign exchange rate contracts  with a positive  replacement  cost . .. 
not those  contracts  with negative  mark-to-market  values. The  replacement  cost is 
defined  as the loss that would be incurred  in the event of counterparty  default, as 
measured  by the net cost of replacing  the contract  at current  market  rates. 
Replacement  cost  includes  only  the  value  of those  contracts which  be- 
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we  illustrate below,  the market value  of the bank's net position  may be 
negative  at the same time as replacement  cost is positive.  This fact does 
not seem  widely  understood.8 
Table 3 presents  quarterly data on notional  values,  replacement  cost, 
and  remaining  maturity  from  1990 to  1993.  Over  this  period,  the  no- 
tional  value  has  more  than  doubled.  Notice  that  the  relationship  be- 
tween  notional  value  and  replacement  value  is not  constant.  Between 
the  first quarter of 1990 and  the  fourth quarter of 1991, notional  value 
rose 21% while  replacement  value  doubled.  From the fourth quarter of 
1991 through  the  final quarter of  1993, notional  value  rose  68% while 
replacement  cost rose by 49%. The third column  shows  the proportion 
of interest-rate  derivatives  with  a remaining  maturity of less  than  one 
year. Note  that the ratio is constant  over our sample period.  The fourth 
column  shows  an estimated  ratio for swaps  alone.  We discuss  the deri- 
vation  of  these  data  later. The  relationship  among  notional  value,  re- 
placement  cost,  and  maturity  structure depends  on  interest  rates.  The 
effect  of a rate movement  on  replacement  value  is influenced  by both 
notional  value  and the maturity structure of swaps.  The final column  of 
Table 3 shows  that interest  rates declined  through  mid-1992,  and  then 
rose a small amount  during the rest of our sample period.  We return to 
this issue  later. 
4.2 REPLACEMENT  COST  AND MARKET  VALUE 
The relationship  between  replacement  cost,  which  banks  provide,  and 
market  value,  which  we  want,  depends  on  the  maturity  structure  of 
swaps  and the path of interest rates. We provide some examples to show 
that it is not possible  to infer market value in a straightforward way from 
changes  in replacement  cost. 
By convention  we assume  that a long interest-rate swap contract pays 
a fixed interest rate and receives  a floating interest rate. Let: 
LtN  be  the  dollar amount  of long  interest-rate  swap  contracts at date  t 
which  were  originated  at date N with  original maturity of co,  and 
S'  be the  dollar amount  of short interest-rate  swap  contracts at date  t 
which  were  originated  at date N with original maturity of co. 
8. Another  issue  with  reported replacement  cost concerns whether  the number represents 
the positive  value  due  to favorable interest-rate movements  or whether  it also incorpo- 
rates reductions  in the  credit risk of counterparties.  In other words,  at the root of the 
replacement-cost  number there is, presumably, a model which the bank uses to value its 
interest-rate derivatives.  Nothing  is known  about these  models.  Banks are not required 
to report  their  models,  so  we  have  no  information  about how  credit risk enters  into 
reported replacement  cost. Table 3  NOTIONAL  VALUE,  REPLACEMENT VALUE,  REMAINING MATURITY, INTEREST RATES 
(ALL BANKS) 
Percentage of total  Adjusted percentage  of 
Replacement  notional value with  total notional value  Three-Month 
Swap Notional  Cost  less than 1 year  with less than 1 year  Treasury-Bill 
Year  Quarter  Value ($ billion)  ($ billion)  remaining maturity  remaining maturity  Rate 
1990  1  1451.2  26.4  49.9  30.7  8.58 
1990  2  1492.6  25.9  49.3  31.1  8.38 
1990  3  1615.9  24.2  49.7  30.6  7.94 
1990  4  1716.8  27.7  49.6  31.5  7.23 
1991  1  1564.1  29.0  47.4  30.4  6.28 
1991  2  1577.6  28.0  47.2  30.0  5.90 
1991  3  1816.1  38.7  49.3  31.3  5.51 
1991  4  1755.9  51.1  48.5  27.0  4.24 
1992  1  1819.8  42.2  49.1  29.6  4.21 
1992  2  1964.8  50.8  50.0  30.0  3.80 
1992  3  2065.2  61.9  50.1  29.2  3.00 
1992  4  2122.0  52.6  50.3  30.2  3.33 
1993  1  2270.3  62.6  50.7  30.2  3.04 
1993  2  2582.3  65.2  51.8  30.1  3.17 
1993  3  2786.1  73.4  51.8  30.0  3.04 
1993  4  2946.3  76.1  51.5  30.5  3.16 
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Banks  report  notional  value  and  replacement  cost.  With  the  above 
notation,  the notional value of a swap portfolio at time t is given by 
NVt -  E  (LtN  +St).  (1) 
w  N>t-o 
The replacement  cost is given by 
RCt =  E  E  [Max  (LtNPtN, 0)  +  Max  (-St  NPt'N, 0)],  (2) 
w  N>t-w 
where  P/'  is the  value  of a $1.00-notional-value  swap  to the  fixed-rate 
payer  written  at  date  N  with  original  maturity  w.  To understand  (2) 
consider  what  happens  to  the  value  of  a  swap  when  interest  rates 
change.  If rates rise,  then  the  swap  becomes  an asset  to the  fixed-rate 
payer  and  a liability  to  the  floating-rate  payer.  Thus,  the  value  of the 
swap  is included  in the "replacement  cost" for the fixed-rate payer, but 
not  for the  floating-rate  payer.  On  the other hand,  if interest  rates fall 
after a swap is made,  then the value of the swap is included  in "replace- 
ment  cost"  only  for the  floating-rate  payer.  The replacement  cost  of a 
portfolio is the sum of (1) the values  of contracts that pay a fixed rate and 
have  a positive  value,  PAN >  0, and (2) the values  of contracts that pay a 
floating rate and have a positive  value,  PtN  <  0. 
The market  value of a portfolio of swap contracts is 
MVt  -  E  (Lt,N-St,N)Pt,N.  (3) 
w  N>t-w 
Comparing  this equation  with  (2), notice that market value is the sum of 
all swap  contracts,  assets  as well  as liabilities. Replacement  cost ignores 
liabilities. 
To examine  the  relationship  between  replacement  cost  and  market 
value,  consider  an example.  Suppose  there are three swaps  outstanding 
in  a portfolio,  all with  one  year  remaining.  Table 4 gives  the  contract 
specifications  for the swap  portfolio.  Assume  that the floating rate is 6% 
(panel A of Table 4). The market value is 
MVt =  ($3 million)(-0.009)  -  ($1 million)(0.009)  -  ($1 million)(-0.0019) 
-$18,868. Banks  and  Derivatives  *  315 
Table  4  NOTIONAL  VALUE  AND REPLACEMENT  VALUE:  EXAMPLES 
Price  Per 
Long  Short  $1 of 
Notional  Contracts  Contracts  Notional 
Value  Position  Fixed  Rate  ($)  ($)  Value 
Panel  A: Floating  Rate  = 6% 
$3 million  Long  7%  $3 million  0  -0.009 
$1 million  Short  5%  0  $1 million  0.009 
$1 million  Short  8%  0  $1 million  -0.019 
Panel  B:  Floating  Rate  = 5% 
$3 million  Long  7%  $3 million  0  -0.019 
$1 million  Short  5%  0  $1 million  0.0 
$1 million  Short  8%  0  $1 million  -0.029 
Note: Price = 1 -  F, where  F is the current value of a one-year bond with a coupon  rate equal to the fixed 
rate. 
The replacement  cost is 
RCt =  -($1  million)(-0.0019)  = $18,868, 
since only the last contract is an asset to the bank. So the market value is 
negative  while  the replacement  cost (as always) is positive. 
If the floating rate changes  to 5% from 6%, then both the market value 
and  the  replacement  cost  are different  (see  panel  B of Table 4). In this 
case: 
MVt =  ($3 million)(-0.019)  -  ($1 million)(0)  -  ($1 million)(-0.0029) 
=  -$28,571 
and 
RCt =  -  ($1 million)(-0.0029)  = $28,571, 
so  the  market  value  is  lower  than  in  the  previous  example,  but  the 
replacement  cost is higher! 
Finally, notice  that if the long contract in Table 4 has notional value $1 
million  rather than $3 million,  market value  and replacement  cost both 
increase when  the interest rate falls from 6% to 5%: When the rate is 6%, 
MVt =  0 and  RCt =  $18,868,  while  when  the  rate is 5%, MVt =  $9,524  and 
RCt =  $28,571.  These  examples  illustrate  that  there  is  no  systematic 
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4.3 MODELING  MARKET  VALUE 
We now  present  a minimal set of assumptions  that lead to a relationship 
between  replacement  cost and market value.  We use the fact that when 
interest  rates change,  both  replacement  cost and market value  change. 
Without  further  structure,  we  have  seen  that  we  cannot  infer  the 
market-value  change  from  the  change  in interest  rates.  Under  the  as- 
sumptions  that (1) the maturity structure of the contracts written is con- 
stant and (2) the direction (long or short) of new contracts written is also 
constant,  we  can derive  market values  from replacement  cost  and  no- 
tional values.  Notice  that these  assumptions  are weaker  than assuming 
that we know  the direction (long or short) of new contracts written,  since 
we  only assume  that the direction is constant over time. 
To understand  the assumptions,  we  need  some  definitions.  Let f  be 
the fraction of new  contracts written in period N that are of maturity c 
(so EJf  = 1). We also want the proportion of new contracts that are long 
and  short.  To find  this,  first define  the  notional  value  of new contracts 
originated  at date N,  NCN: 
NCN=  E  (LLN?+SNN).  (4) 
Then  the  shares  of new  contracts in existence  at t that were  written  at 
date N with  original maturity c that are, respectively,  long and short are 
lN~  NN  (5)  t,N 
N  ftNCN 
and 
St 
-d)  -  (6)  t  fNCN  (6) 
Note  that this implies  that 
,N +  SNN  =  1.  (7) 
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ASSUMPTION  1  For any maturity co  and issuance  date N, fw = f  . 
Assumption  1 says that the proportion  of contracts written that are of 
a given  maturity  is fixed over time.  This assumption  also  says  that the 
proportion  of contracts that are written  of a given  maturity is the same 
over time regardless  of whether  the contract is long or short. 
ASSUMPTION  2  For any co,  N, and K < N, 
or, alternatively  stated, 
t,N  _  t,N-K 
f  NCN  f  NCN-K 
Assumption  2 says  that the  fraction of newly  written  long  contracts 
with  maturity  w is constant  through  time.  (Assumption  1 said that the 
sum of long and short contracts of a given maturity written at any time is 
a constant  fraction of the total contracts written at that time.) 
Assumption  1 allows  us to derive new  contracts from notional  value. 
Write the notional  value as 
^^S  S  r^  (8)  NVt=E  E  foNCN'  (8) 
(o  N>t-  w 
Equation  (8)  says  that  the  notional  value  is  the  sum  of  all  contracts 
written in the past (i.e.,  at dates N) that have not reached maturity (i.e., 
N >  t -  to). Given the notional value and the f  , the system  of equations 
in (8) has  one  equation  and one  unknown  for each period.  Solving  this 
system  of equations  gives  new  contracts, which  we use below. 
To write  the  replacement  cost,  we  need  to divide  previously  written 
contracts into assets  and liabilities.  Let {a,} be the set of dates such that 
long contracts written  on the date of maturity o are assets at date t, i.e., 
P  ?  >  0.  Similarly, let {b,} be  the  set  of  dates  such  that long  contracts 
written  on  the  date  of maturity to are liabilities at date t, i.e.,  PN  <  0. 
Now,  rewrite the replacement  cost as: 
RC=  L  Pt  E  E  Sao{Ptw  RC,=  a  E ELP,-,  t,b  t, 
b  (9) 
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From Assumption  1 we  know  that 
f  NCN  =  LtN  S.  (10) 
Substitute  this into RCt: 
RCt =  > Lt Pt,a 
-  C  (  NCb  -  Lt)PtP 
aE{a,f  }  ,o  bE{b,} 
or, rewriting, 
RC,  =  Z  L  PN  -  f  fNCb  Pt  (11) 
o  N>t-w  o  be{b,,} 
Using  Assumption  2, the replacement  cost can be written 
RCt,  =  lf  'NCN PtN  f  NCbPb.  (12) 
o  N>t-o  w  bE{b,} 
To estimate  the 1l, we rewrite (12). Since the 1W  only appear in the first set 
of summations,  bring the terms in (12) that do not depend  on 1l together: 
RCt  +  E  E  f -NCb  Ptwb  = E  E  |  f  NCN  Pt N  (13)  RC,+X  SfNC,Pb  ~  l'  f  NCNP?.  (13) 
wo  be{b,}  w  N>t-w 
Now,  define  RCt  to be the left-hand  side of (13): 
RCt = RC  t  +  fNCbPtb,  (14) 
w  bE{b,} 
and define  At to be the known  or assumed  variables on the right-hand 
side of (13): 
At;-  f  NCN Pt.  (15) 
N>t-w 
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RCt =  At  l"  (16) 
(o 
which  is the equation  we use to find long and short swap positions. 
The variables in equation  (15) are new  contracts, which  we find using 
(8); f  , the maturity structure of new  contracts; and bond  prices.  So we 
can calculate At,  which  feeds  in as a variable in (16). The same informa- 
tion determines  RC* from (14). Using  this,  (16) can be solved  for the  1W. 
Plugging  the  1w  into  (3) using  the identity  1w  +  so =  1 gives  the market 
value: 
MVt  =  E  E  (l  -  s)  f  NC  Pt,.  (17) 
w  N>t-o 
We are also interested  in the interest-rate  sensitivity  of swap  positions. 
We adopt  a simple  definition  of interest-rate sensitivity  as the change  in 
market value  from a parallel shift  in the yield  curve  (i.e.,  a one-factor 
term structure model): 
V  =  E  ((A-  ) f  NCNt  (18) 
drt  ,  N>t-w  drt 
The change  in  the  price of the  swap  depends  on  how  a coupon  bond 
changes  price  when  interest  rates  change.  This  is  straightforward  to 
compute.  The  simplification  of  a parallel  shift  in  the  yield  curve  is  a 
common  one. 
5.  The  Empirical  Procedure  for  Finding  Market  Values 
5.1 CALIBRATION  PROCEDURE 
We find  market values  and  interest-rate  sensitivities  by calibrating the 
model  above  using  available  data.  To  calculate  market  values  and 
interest-rate  sensitivities,  we  need: 
1.  RCt, the replacement  cost, 
2.  PtN, the prices for swaps  of different maturities and origination dates, 
3.  f  ,  the fraction of new  contracts written by maturity, and 
4.  NCN, the new  contracts written in each period. 320 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
We have  data on replacement  cost and prices.  The missing  piece  in the 
puzzle  is the fraction of new  contracts written,  the f's.  Given the f's,  we 
can find new  contracts using  data on notional  value.  Since there are no 
data on the maturity structure of new  contracts, we  use indirect means 
to find the appropriate maturity structure. 
We assume  that initial  swap  maturities  are between  0 and  5 years.9 
Divide swaps  into five buckets by initial maturity: 0-1 year (f?), 1-2 years 
(fl), 2-3  years (f2), 3-4  years (f3), and 4-5  years (f4). We determine the f's 
by calibration using  the one  piece  of information  on maturity structure 
that banks  report.  Since  1990 banks  have  been  required  to  report the 
notional  value  of  interest-rate  derivatives  (excluding  futures)  with  re- 
maining maturities less than 1 year and greater than 1 year. Our strategy 
is to calibrate the maturity structure of new contracts so that the implied 
remaining  maturities  match  the  reported  remaining  maturities.  Under 
Assumption  1, the maturity structure of swap contracts is assumed  to be 
constant  over time. 
The  calibration  procedure  leads  us  to  heavily  weight  the  0-1-year 
maturity bucket in order to match the reported data on remaining matu- 
rity. It is not surprising  that banks have a lot of short-term swaps,  since 
banks  are not  required  to hold  capital against  swaps  with  a remaining 
maturity  less  than  one  year,  but  are required  to  hold  capital  against 
longer-term  swaps. 
Given  assumptions  on maturity structure, we  calculate new  contracts 
using  (8).  We have  quarterly  data  on  notional  value  from  the  second 
quarter of  1985 through  the  fourth  quarter of  1993. Although  we  only 
have  replacement-cost  data starting in 1990, we  calculate new  contracts 
from 1985. A contract of 5 years written in the second quarter of 1985 will 
have  a remaining  maturity  of  one  quarter in  the  first quarter of  1990. 
Thus,  our new  contracts data match our desire to allow for maturities at 
least as long  as five years. 
With our estimates  of new contracts, we can use (16) to determine long 
positions.  In (16), we  determine  five variables, 10,  11, 12, 13, and  14. These 
correspond  to the fractions of contracts in each maturity bucket that are 
long,  so each of the 1 must be between  0 and 1 [see (5)]. To impose  these 
constraints when  we calibrate, we use quadratic programming  (see Had- 
ley, 1964). Finally, given  the 1",  we can derive market value from (17) and 
interest-rate sensitivity  from (18). 
9. To the extent  that swaps  have  initial maturities greater than 5 years, we  underestimate 
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5.2 PRELIMINARY  DATA  ADJUSTMENTS 
Replacement  cost and the remaining maturity data, as mentioned  above, 
are reported for all interest-rate derivatives  (excluding futures), whereas 
we are interested  in swaps only. To get the replacement cost of swaps,  we 
need  to adjust the reported number to allow for the replacement  cost of 
nonswap  interest-rate derivatives.  To determine  how  to adjust the data, 
we examined  the annual reports of approximately the top 100 bank hold- 
ing companies.  Table 5 presents  data from the annual reports of the U.S. 
banks with large swap holdings  listed in Table 1, plus several other large 
banks with significant swap positions.  The table shows  the data on swaps 
from bank annual reports: notional value, replacement cost, and the ratio 
of replacement  cost to notional value. Notice that, even in this group, only 
about  half the banks  report replacement  cost (and fewer  report market 
value).10 Among  the banks that report replacement  cost,  the ratio of re- 
placement  cost  to  notional  value  varies  across  banks  (and  over  time, 
though  this is not shown  in the table). As a comparison,  we present data 
on the ratio of replacement cost to notional value for all nonswap  interest- 
rate derivatives.  We get this last series of data by subtracting the annual- 
report notional  values  and  replacement  costs  for swaps  from the  same 
data for interest-rate  derivatives  reported  in the  Call Reports. The table 
shows  that the ratio is generally higher for swaps  than for other interest- 
rate derivatives.  This  is  expected,  since  the  "other" category  includes 
options,  which  have a lower interest-rate sensitivity. 
Table 5 suggests  that the swap ratio is equal to or higher than the ratio 
for nonswap  interest-rate  derivatives.  Since we  rely on Call Report  data 
for most of our empirical work, we adjust reported replacement cost (for 
all interest-rate  derivatives)  to get  an estimate  of replacement  cost  for 
interest-rate  swaps.  The  adjustment  involves  proportionally  reducing 
the  reported  replacement  cost  in  the  Call Reports by  the  ratio of  the 
notional  value of interest-rate swaps  to the notional value of all interest- 
rate derivatives  except  futures.1  We experimented  with  other ratios in 
the range indicated  in Table 5, but found  that the exact assumption  did 
not affect the qualitative results. 
The ratio of remaining  maturity less  than  1 year to notional  value  is 
different  for interest-rate  swaps  than for other interest-rate derivatives. 
Since we target this ratio in our calibration, we would  like to use the ratio 
for interest-rate swaps,  rather than for all interest-rate derivatives.  There- 
10. Other banks in the group reported  replacement  cost for all interest-rate  derivatives. 
11. We exclude the notional value of futures, since futures have a zero replacement  cost 
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Table 5  NOTIONAL  SWAP VALUE AND  REPLACEMENT  COST FROM BANK 
ANNUAL  REPORTS (DATA FOR 1993) 
Ratio of  Ratio of 
Reported  Swap  Replacement 
Replacement  Cost to 
Notional Swap  Replacement  Cost to  Notional Value 
Value  Cost  Reported  Swap  for Call 
Firm  ($ billion)  ($ billion)  Notional Value  Reports 
Chemical Bank  667.9  8.6  1.29  1.20 
J. P. Morgan  567.7  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Bankers Trust  349.7  9.57  2.74  1.95 
Citicorp  244.3  6.8  2.78  1.46 
Bank of  223.4  6.85  3.07  2.40 
America 
Chase  178.7  5.6  3.13  1.77 
Manhattan 
First Chicago  114.9  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Continental  Illinois  47.4  1.44  3.04  1.77 
Banc One  36.4  0.29  0.80  0.85 
Republic Bank  25.9  0.53  2.04  1.89 
First Union  16.8  0.31  1.83  0.81 
Mellon Bank  13.6  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Bank of New  York  10.8  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Bank of Boston  10.2  N/A  N/A  N/A 
First Interstate  9.3  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Wells Fargo  2.1  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Source:  Individual  bank  annual  reports. 
fore, we  estimate  the ratio for swaps  using  individual  bank data. Banks 
holding  interest-rate  swaps  are assigned  to  one  of  five  portfolios  (as 
discussed  in the subsequent  section).  For each of the five portfolios,  we 
perform a cross-sectional  regression  of the reported remaining  maturity 
for all interest-rate  derivatives  on intercept  and  slope  dummies  for the 
ratio of swaps  to total interest-rate  derivatives.12 We use  the estimated 
coefficients  from the regression  to construct the remaining maturity ratio 
for swaps.  The ratio is relatively constant with a mean of 33.5% of swap 
12. The estimated  regression  is 
remaining  maturity  73.7 -  0.39 (swaps/total)1 -  0.46 (swaps/total)2 - 
0.35 (swaps/total)3 -0.16  (swaps/total)4 -  0.45 (swaps/total)5, 
where  (swaps/total)i  is  the  ratio of  swaps  to all interest-rate  derivatives  for banks  in 
portfolio  i. All coefficients  are significant at the 5% confidence  level.  The adjusted R2  of 
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contracts  with  a remaining  maturity of less  than one  year (see  the col- 
umn headed  "Adjusted  percentage" in Table 3). 
Prices are calculated  using  interest  rates on U.S.  government  securi- 
ties.  There are four implicit assumptions  in this calculation.  First, swap 
contracts typically  are indexed  to LIBOR rather than Treasury-bill rates. 
LIBOR and  Treasury rates are highly  but not  perfectly  correlated.  Sec- 
ond,  credit risk is not included  in our calculation. Third, we assume  that 
all interest-rate  swaps  are the  straightforward  "plain vanilla" fixed-for- 
floating contracts discussed  above.  Among  the other types of swaps  that 
banks  trade are amortizing  swaps  and exotic swaps.  Amortizing  swaps 
have a notional value that declines  over the life of the swap,  much as the 
principal due on an amortizing loan (such as a home mortgage) declines. 
These swaps  are like plain vanilla swaps with a slightly shorter duration. 
Exotic swaps  are small in notional value, but may be highly interest-rate- 
sensitive.13 Fourth,  we  assume  swaps  are held  to maturity. Some  swap 
positions  are closed  out  early. To the  extent  that  swaps  positions  are 
closed  prior  to  maturity,  we  underestimate  initial  maturity. However, 
our estimates  of interest-rate sensitivity  are not affected by this. 
6. Market  Value  of the  Banking  System's  Interest-Rate 
Swap  Position 
6.1 THE  BANKING  SYSTEM 
In  this  subsection,  we  look  at  the  banking  system  as  a  whole.  Our 
calibration  technique  assumes  that the  maturity  structure of new  con- 
tracts written  is constant  (Assumption  1). We choose  a maturity struc- 
ture  (the f  to  match  the  mean  reported  proportion  of  swaps  with 
remaining  maturity of less than one year. As Table 3 shows,  this propor- 
tion  is  fairly constant  during  the  1990s (the only  period  for which  we 
have data). Moreover, since there is not a unique set of f  /  consistent  with 
reported remaining  maturities,  we examine three patterns of f '. We vary 
the  buckets  for swaps  with  initial  maturities  greater than  one  year  to 
produce,  roughly  speaking,  flat, U-shaped,  and inversely  U-shaped  ma- 
turity structures  for contracts of over one-year  initial maturity. The flat 
pattern  is f  =  0.28  and f1  =  f2  = f3  = f4 =  0.18;  the  U-shaped  pattern  is f0 
=  0.28,  f1  =  f4  =  0.35,  and  f2  =  f3  =  0.01;  and  the  inversely  U-shaped 
pattern  is f0  =  0.28,  f1  = f4  =  0.01,  and  f2  = f3  =  0.35. 
Table 6  shows  the  results  for the  aggregate  swap  positions  of  U.S. 
13. Estimates suggest  that the proportion of exotic swaps  is small. An example of an exotic 
swap  is  the  deal  between  Bankers Trust and  Proctor and  Gamble.  The value  of this 
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Table  6  ESTIMATES  OF MARKET  VALUE  AND INTEREST  SENSITIVITY:  ALL  BANKS 
Maturity Structure  of New Contracts 
Flat  U-Shaped  Inverse U-Shaped 
f? = 0.28  f? = 0.28  fo = 0.28 
f  =  = f3 = f4 = 0.18  fl  =f4  = 0.35  f'  =4  = 0.01 
f2 = f3  0.01  f2  f3 =0.35 
Estimated 10,  I1,  12,  13, 4  10  = I1 =  12 =  1  1? = I1 =  12  =  13 =  1  1? =  11 =  2 =  1 
13 =  0.672  14 =  0.39  13  =4  =  0.0 
l4  =  0.0 
Swap notional valuea  1971.66  1971.66  1971.66 
($ billions) 
Adjusted replacement  46.00  46.00  46.00 
valuea  ($ billion) 
Estimated  market  valueb  8.88  4.44  13.55 
($ billion) 
Estimated  interest  -11.8  -0.24  -33.2 
sensitivitya,b 
($ billion) 
Standard  deviation of  3.14  2.41  7.48 
interest sensitivitya 
($ billion) 
Change in  -4.82  -0.14  -13.51 
equity valuea  per 100- 
basis-point  change in the 
interest rate (%) 
Estimated  fraction  of  36.7  17.2  45.0 
existing contracts  that 
are short (%) 
a Mean value for 16 quarters, 90:1-93:4. 
b Change  in market value ($ billion) per 100 basis point increase in the interest rate. 
commercial banks.  For each of the three different calibrations, the table 
reports the mean fraction of swap contracts that are long,  for each initial 
maturity  (10  -  14).  These  estimates  are used  to compute  market values 
using  (17) and interest-rate  sensitivities  using  (18). The mean  values  of 
these  variables for the 16 quarters in 1990-1993 are shown  together with 
the standard deviation  of the interest sensitivity. The ratio of the interest 
sensitivity  to the total equity in the banking system  is a means  of deter- 
mining  the economic  significance  of the interest  sensitivity.  The ratio is 
given  in the penultimate  row of the table. 
The table shows  that banks are, on net,  long  at short maturities,  but 
short at long  maturities.  For all three calibrations, we  find that 1?  and 1' 
equal one  while  14 is close  to zero for two of the three cases.  The 1W  and 
the f  generate  a market value  for the aggregate  swap  portfolio.  In the Banks  and Derivatives *  325 
three examples,  the mean ratio of estimated  market value to replacement 
cost is between  10 and 30%. This is because  banks hold  swaps  that are 
both  assets  and  liabilities,  and  replacement  cost  does  not  net  out  the 
liabilities. 
This fact that banks are long in the short maturities means that most of 
the  contracts  banks  write  and  most  of  the  contracts  they  hold  at any 
moment  are long.  For the U-shaped  maturity structure, for example,  less 
than one-quarter  of the existing  contracts are short (see  the last row of 
Table 6). But this does  not tell us how  the market value of their position 
changes  with  interest  rates,  since  their  long  contracts  are  shorter  in 
maturity than their short contracts. The interest-rate sensitivity  depends 
more heavily  on the direction of the longer  maturities,  since the longer 
maturities are more sensitive  to interest-rate changes. 
Because  the banking  system  is net  short in the longer  maturities,  an 
increase  in  interest  rates  could  seriously  erode  equity  in  the  banking 
system.  We can directly address this question by calculating interest-rate 
sensitivity.  Even for the U-shaped  maturity structure, where over 75% of 
the contracts are long,  interest-rate sensitivity  is negative,  indicating that 
the  swap  portfolio  as  a  whole  is  effectively  net  short.  For the  three 
calibrations,  interest-rate  sensitivity  ranges  from  -33  to  -0.24.  This 
means  that a 100-basis-point increase in interest rates reduces total bank 
equity  by an amount  between  $240 million  and $33 billion.  To see  how 
big  the  reported  interest-rate  sensitivity  is,  compare  it  with  the  total 
equity in the banking  system.  Using  the intermediate  value for interest- 
rate sensitivity  of -12,  a 100-basis-point increase in interest rates reduces 
bank  equity  by  5%. Interest  rates  in  1994 went  up  by  200-300  basis 
points,  indicating  that, looking at swaps in isolation,  the banking system 
could have lost roughly  10-15% of its equity. 
The  finding  that  the  banks  lost  significant  value  on  swap  holdings 
does  not  imply  that bank equity  fell during  1994. Swap  positions  may 
have  hedged  other  bank  holdings.  Although  some  banks  have  taken 
significant  writedowns  against  equity  because  of losses  on derivatives, 
system-wide  equity has not declined,  at least as measured  by regulatory 
accounting  rules.14 In Section  7, we  explore  the  extent  to which  swap 
positions  are hedged. 
Notice  that we  report no "standard errors" in Table 6. This is because 
we  use  a  calibration  on  the  entire  population  of  banks.  There  is  no 
sampling  error (i.e.,  we  use  data  on  all banks).  Any  errors in  our re- 
ported  values  come  from errors in our assumptions  about the maturity 
14. In April 1994, a variety of news  reports indicated that the largest dealer banks reported 
lower than expected  earnings because of derivatives trading losses.  More recently, Banc 
One,  Mellon,  and other end-user  banks have also reported losses  on derivatives. 326 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
structure of new  contracts or errors in our adjustments  to the data. One 
way  to  assess  the  robustness  of  our  assumptions  is  to  see  how  our 
results  change  as we  vary the assumed  maturity structure.  The results 
are  qualitatively  similar  for  all  three  maturity  structures.  To simplify 
reporting,  henceforth,  we  show  only  the flat maturity structure.  How- 
ever,  as  above,  using  other  maturity  structures  calibrated  on  the  re- 
ported remaining  maturity does  not qualitatively change our results. 
One  further point  concerns  interbank swaps.  In our aggregation,  we 
do  not  net  out interbank  swaps.  Thus,  the data we  use  are not the net 
position  of the  banking  system,  but  rather the  total gross activity. This 
does  not  introduce  any problems  into  our analysis,  because  we  aggre- 
gate  replacement  cost.  Viewing  the  industry  as a whole,  any  contract 
between  two  banks  has  a net  zero  replacement  cost.  Our aggregation 
procedure  yields  a positive  replacement  cost while assuming  a zero mar- 
ket value  for any interbank swaps. 
6.2 THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF INTEREST-RATE  RISK  AMONG  BANKS 
Swap activity is concentrated  at a small number of banks. This suggests 
that these  banks may use  swaps  for different reasons  than other banks. 
For example,  swap  positions  may differ if some large banks specialize  in 
intermediating  interest-rate  risk while  other banks use  swaps  for hedg- 
ing  purposes.  To examine  this,  we  divide  banks into portfolios  by  size 
and swap  activity. 
We form eight portfolios: 
1.  the  seven  large  dealer banks  listed  in a House  Banking Committee 
Minority Staff report (1993);15 
2.  the top thirty banks,  by average assets  from 1990 to 1993, excluding 
the dealer banks in portfolio  1;16 
3.  banks holding  swaps  with  average assets  greater than $5 billion,  but 
not in portfolio  1 or 2; 
4.  banks  holding  swaps  with  average  assets  between  $1 billion and $5 
billion; 
5.  banks  holding  swaps  with  average  assets  between  $500 million  and 
$1 billion; 
15. The Staff report lists eight major  dealer banks, but we exclude Continental  Bank  be- 
cause it was controlled  by regulators  during  much  of this period  (see footnote  6 for  a list 
of the seven other banks). 
16. Many of the banks in portfolio 2 conduct swap activity both as end users and as 
dealers (this is indicated  by the fact that these banks are members  of the International 
Swap Dealers Association).  However, in general, these banks have a smaller  propor- 
tion of dealer activity  than banks in portfolio  1 (see, for example, Swaps  Monitor,  July 
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6.  banks  not holding  swaps  with  average assets  greater than $5 billion, 
but not in portfolio  1 or 2; 
7.  banks  not holding  swaps  with  average assets  between  $1 billion and 
$5 billion; 
8.  banks  not holding  swaps  with  average  assets  between  $500 million 
and $1 billion. 
We  want  to  calibrate  the  swap  maturities  for  the  five  portfolios  that 
include  swaps.  To do this,  we  choose  a maturity structure for new  con- 
tracts  (for  each  portfolio)  to  match  reported  remaining  maturity,  as 
above.  The model  assumes  that a constant  proportion  of new  contracts 
are written with each maturity. The only information we have to confirm 
that banks are writing  new  contracts in constant  proportions  is the esti- 
mated ratio of swap contracts with less than 1 year remaining maturity to 
total  swap  contracts.  Table 7  shows  the  proportion  of  contracts  with 
remaining  maturity  of less  than  one  year for the  1990-1993  period,  by 
portfolio.17 For portfolios  1-3,  the proportion of remaining maturity less 
than  1 year  is  relatively  stable.  It is less  so  for the  portfolios  4-5,  but 
these  groups  hold few  swaps  (see Table 2).18 
Table  8  presents  results  for  the  five  portfolios  of  banks  that  hold 
swaps.  Note  first that we calibrate the portfolios separately based on the 
value-weighted  remaining  maturities.  Portfolios  1 and 2 have  approxi- 
mately  the  same  remaining  maturities,  so  we  use  the  same  assumed 
maturity structure. 
The table shows  that large banks are long in the short maturities (10,  1', 
12, and  13),  but  short  in  the  longest  maturity  (14).  As  the  bank  size  de- 
creases,  this  pattern  roughly  reverses.  The portfolio  with  the  smallest 
banks,  portfolio  5, is short in the short maturities (1?  and 11)  and long in 
the  long  maturities  (12 and  13). It is important  to keep  in mind  that the 
smaller banks have little swap activity. Swaps clearly are not the primary 
mechanism  for small banks to hedge  interest-rate risk. 
Consistent  with  large banks  holding  most  swaps,  the dollar value  of 
interest sensitivity  is highest  for portfolio 1. A 100-basis-point increase in 
interest rates reduces  the value of dealer banks by $9 billion (prior to any 
potential  gains  from hedging).  The banks in portfolio 2 would  lose  only 
$3 billion from a 100-basis-point  increase in rates. The smaller portfolios 
17. These  columns  are just linear transformations  of the reported remaining  maturity for 
interest-rate  derivatives  (see footnote  12 for the adjustment  regression). 
18. Note  that our procedure  assumes  that the maturity structure of new  contracts is con- 
stant.  For individual  banks,  the  proportion  of remaining  maturity less  than  1 year is 
often  not constant.  Thus,  attempting  to calibrate individual  bank positions  introduces 
too  much  noise  to derive  meaningful  additional  information.  This is one  reason  we 
form portfolios  rather than calibrating on a bank-by-bank basis. Table 7  PROPORTION OF SWAPS WITH LESS THAN  ONE YEAR REMAINING, BY BANK GROUP (PERCENTAGE) 
Portfolio  1  Portfolio  2  Portfolio  3  Portfolio  4  Portfolio  5 
Dealer  Top 30, Not  Total  Assets >  $5  Total Assets  Total Assets 




































































































12.3 Table  8  MARKET  VALUE  AND  INTEREST  SENSITIVITIES  OF  SWAP  POSITIONS  BY BANK  GROUP 
Portfolio  3 
Portfolio 1  Portfolio 2  Banks  with Total  Portfolio  4  Portfolio  5 
Dealer  Top  30,  Excluding  Assets >  $5 Billion,  Banks with Total Assets  Banks  with Total Assets 
Banks  Dealer Banks  but Not in Top  30  $1-5  Billion  $500 Million-1  Billion 
I  .. 
Calibrated maturity  f? =  0.28 
structure  fl  = f2 =  =  f= 
4 =  0.18  f1 
Estimated  0, 11,  l2, 13,  14  10 =  1 =  12 =  1.0 
13 =  0.67 
l4 =  0.0 
Swap notional  valuea 
($ billion) 
Adjusted  replacement 
value ($ billion) 
Estimated market 




Standard deviation  of 
interest sensitivitya 
($ billion) 
Percent change  in 
equity valuea per 
100-bp change 
in int.  rate (%) 
Estimated fraction of 
existing contracts 








f0 =  0.28  f0 =  0.38  f0 =  0.78  fo =  0.16 
2 = f3=  f  =  0.18  f  =  f2  = f3 = f4  = 0.155  fl  = f2  =  f3  =  f4  =  0.055  f  = f2 = f3 = f4  =  0.21 
10  =  11  =12=  1.0  10=  1 =  1.0  10= 1.0  1  =  0.0 
3 =  0.63  12= 0.07  1 =  12 =  13  = 0.0  1  =  0.05 
4 =  0.0  13= 0.0  14  = 0.55  12  =  13  =  1.0 
14  =  0.55  14  =  0.44 























33.80  60.26 
aMean value  for 16 quarters,  90:1-93:4. 
bChange in market value  ($ billion)  per 100-basis-point  change  in interest  rate. 330 *  GORTON  & ROSEN 
would  be  affected  much  less  by  rate changes.  However,  to assess  the 
effect on banks-and  especially  the potential  for bank failure-the  rele- 
vant  measure  is the  fraction of bank equity  lost when  rates change.  By 
this measure,  the dealer banks in portfolio  1 are much more exposed  to 
rate increases  than banks in any of the other portfolios; the dealer banks 
lose 23% of their equity from each 100-basis-point change in rates, while 
other  portfolios  lose  less  than 5% of their equity  (once again,  ignoring 
hedging). 
7.  Hedging Interest-Rate  Risk  From  Swaps 
Our evidence  shows  that the banks, especially large ones,  are exposed  to 
interest-rate  risk  from  their  swap  portfolios,  viewed  in  isolation.  We 
examine  in two  ways  the degree  to which  swaps  are hedged.  First, we 
examine whether  the on-balance-sheet  positions  of banks are sensitive  to 
interest  rates in  such  a way  as to offset  the  sensitivity  induced  by the 
swap  position.  This is consistent  with  banks using  swaps  to hedge  on- 
balance-sheet  risk. Second,  we  look at the extent to which  reported net 
income  varies  with  interest  rates and compare  this with  our results  on 
the interest-rate  sensitivity  of swap positions. 
7.1  MATURITY  GAPS 
Banks are exposed  to interest-rate risk from their on-balance-sheet  activi- 
ties when  their assets  do not reprice at the same time as their liabilities. 
One  measure  of the interest-rate sensitivity  of a bank's balance sheet  is 
its one-year  maturity  gap.  The one-year  maturity gap is the difference 
between  the value of assets  that reprice within one year and the value of 
liabilities that reprice within one year, divided by total assets.19 For exam- 
ple,  if a bank has $20 million  of assets  that reprice within  one year and 
$30 million  of liabilities  that reprice within  one  year, then  the one-year 
gap  is negative.  If interest  rates rise,  the bank will have  to pay higher 
rates on $30 million  of its liabilities and will receive higher rates on only 
$20 million  of assets.  Thus,  in this example,  higher rates imply reduced 
equity  value.  We get data on the maturity structure of bank on-balance- 
sheet  portfolios  from the Call Reports. 
Finding  the  one-year  maturity  gap  requires  assumptions  about  the 
repricing  frequency  of  demand  deposits  and  other  liabilities  held  by 
consumers.  Demand  deposits  can be  instantaneously  withdrawn,  but 
evidence  suggests  that banks do not change their interest rates on depos- 
19. Floating-rate loans reprice at the frequency that the floating interest rate is recomputed. Banks  and  Derivatives  - 331 
its  when  market  rates  change  (see  Rosen,  1994). Moreover,  NOW  ac- 
counts  also have  effective  maturities longer  than their stated maturities 
(see  Hutchison  and Pennacchi,  1994). We use two  estimates  of the one- 
year maturity gap. The first (MATGAP) assumes  that all assets and liabili- 
ties have effective  maturities equal to their stated maturities. The second 
(MATGAP*) adjusts  demand  deposits  and  NOW  accounts  to allow  for 
the longer effective  maturities of these instruments.  We assume  that 40% 
of  demand  deposits  and  40% of NOW  accounts  do  not  reprice within 
one  year.20 
Table 9 reports  our two  measures  of maturity gap by year and bank 
size.  The striking fact seen  in the table is that dealer banks (portfolio 1) 
have a large positive  maturity gap by either gap measure,  while  smaller 
banks  consistently  tend  to have  negative  maturity gaps.  This suggests 
that  the  short  swap  positions  of  dealer  banks  are  offset  by  the  on- 
balance-sheet  portfolio.  When interest rates rise, the swap positions  lose 
value while  the on-balance-sheet  items gain in value.  Unfortunately, the 
one-year  maturity  gap  is  too  coarse  a  measure  to  determine  the  net 
interest-rate  sensitivity  of dealer banks as a group. 
The large nondealer  banks (portfolio 2) have relatively small (in magni- 
tude)  maturity  gaps.  This  suggests  that  an  increase  in  interest  rates 
reduces  the value  of the swap portfolio, but this is not offset by changes 
in the value of on-balance-sheet  items.  Smaller banks tend to have nega- 
tive maturity gaps,  but fairly small swap exposures. 
7.2 USING  NET  INCOME  TO ESTIMATE  THE  EXTENT  OF 
SWAP  HEDGING 
We can take advantage  of accounting  identities  to derive  a more exact 
measure  of the degree  to which  banks' swap  exposures  offset exposure 
elsewhere  in  the  banks'  portfolios.  Banks report  swap  activity  in  two 
ways.  Banks  are  allowed  by  regulators  to  declare  some  swaps  to  be 
hedging  other  bank  activities  (such  as  fixed-rate loans  or interest-rate 
futures).  Banks  use  "hedge  accounting"  to  value  swaps  that  are  de- 
clared as hedges.  Gains and  losses  on  swaps  in the hedge  account  are 
recognized  when  gains  and  losses  on  the  instruments  that the  swaps 
hedge  are  recognized.  In  other  words,  the  reported  net  income  on 
hedge-account  swaps  and  the  instruments  they  hedge  is  zero.  Other 
swaps  are considered  to be in the bank's trading account.  Swaps  in the 
trading  account  are  reported  at  market  value.  When  interest  rates 
move,  only  the change  in value  of trading-account  swaps  is reported as 
net income. 
20. This  adjustment  appears  consistent  with  the  "management  adjustments"  that  Banc 
One uses,  as reported in its 1993 annual report. Table 9  MATURITY GAPS BY BANK GROUP 
Portfolio 1  Portfolio  2  Portfolio  3  Portfolio  4  Portfolio5 
Year  MATGAP  MATGAP"  MATGAP  MATGAP*  MATGAP  MATGAP*  MATGAP  MATGAP*  MATGAP  MATGAP* 
1990  23.4  28.7  -8.7  1.2  -7.7  1.9  -12.7  -1.8  -15.7  -3.9 
1991  21.6  27.0  -11.7  -1.2  -12.0  -1.6  -17.2  -5.6  -19.5  -6.9 
1992  19.7  25.9  -13.2  -1.2  -14.5  -2.3  -19.6  -6.4  -22.7  -8.4 
1993  20.4  26.5  -9.9  2.4  -12.4  0.1  -18.9  -5.3  -22.5  -7.8 
Mean  21.3  27.0  -10.9  0.31  -11.6  -0.5  -17.1  -4.7  -20.1  -6.7 
a MATGAP is the one-year  maturity gap assuming  that all assets  and liabilities have  effective  maturities  equal  to their stated  maturities.  MATGAP* assumes 
that 40% of demand  deposits  and 40% of NOW  accounts  do not reprice within  one year. 
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This yields  the accounting  identity: 
net income  =  net income  of the unhedged  nonswap  activities 
+ change  in (market) value of unhedged  swaps 
+ net income  of hedged  swaps 
+ net income  of hedged  nonswap  activities. 
Because  of the accounting  rules,  the last two  terms sum  to zero.  In the 
previous  section,  we  calculate the change  in market value of bank swap 
positions  when  interest  rates  change.  We do  not  know  how  the  net 
income  of  the  unhedged  nonswap  activities  varies  with  interest  rates. 
We assume  that the relationship  between  net income and swap interest- 
rate sensitivity  is given  by the regression 
dMVt 
NIt,,  =a  +  dr  PArt  +  it  X,,  +  Et,p,  (19) 
tdr 
where  NIt,  is the reported  net income  at date t for portfolio p, Xt,p  is a 
vector of other independent  variables that affect reported net income  of 
unhedged  nonswap  activities,  and  Et, is a white-noise  error term. The 
regression  coefficient  /  measures  the proportion  of the  swap  portfolio 
that is unhedged. 
Since banks  have  nonswap  instruments  that are affected  by interest 
rates but  that may  not  be  hedged  by  swaps,  reported  net  income  can 
change  with  interest  rates from factors other than a change  in the value 
of the swap  portfolio.  To take account of this, we include  the change  in 
interest rates as part of Xt,,. Net income is also affected by the default rate 
on loans.  The default rate on loans may be correlated with interest rates 
(since  both  depend  on  macroeconomic  factors),  so  we  include  loan 
chargeoffs  in Xt,,. All the variables except the change in interest rates are 
divided  by total assets  to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
Table 10 presents  the regression results. We pool the eight portfolios in 
the regressions  in columns  1-3.  Notice  that the change  in interest rates 
and chargeoffs  are both significant, with the expected signs (see columns 
1 and  2).  The key  regression,  in column  3, has  size  dummies  for each 
portfolio  and  size  dummies  interacted  with  the interest-rate  sensitivity 
variable calculated  above  for the five portfolios  with  swaps.  In this re- 
gression,  we  focus  on  the  coefficients  on  the interaction  term.  For the 
dealer  banks,  the  coefficient  is  0.09.  This means  that 9% of  the  swap 
exposure  is unhedged.  This is consistent  with their swap position  being 
short and  their on-balance-sheet  position  being  long  (positive  maturity 
gap).  The large, nondealer  banks (portfolio 2) have an exposure  of 47%. 
This  suggests  that  a  much  smaller  fraction  of  their  swap  portfolio  is Table 10  SENSITIVITY OF NET INCOME TO SWAP POSITIONS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Independent  Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard 
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1.14  0.054a 
Dependent variable  is net income divided by total assets. AR  is the change in the 3-month  T-bill  rate;  (dMV/dR,)  AR  is the interest  sensitivity 
of portfolio  i's swap portfolio  times the change in the 3-month  T-bill  rate;  Portfolio  i is a dummy variable  for portfolio  i. 
aSignificant  at the 0.01 level. 
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hedged.  Once  again,  this is consistent  with  recent reports of losses  on 
swaps  by  these  banks.  Examples  in the  fourth quarter of  1994 include 
Bank  One,  which  announced  losses  of  $170 million  on  "interest-rate 
bets"; Mellon  Bank, which  took  a $130 million  charge to cover  deriva- 
tives  losses;  and KeyCorp,  which  took a $100 million charge (Wall Street 
Journal, January 9, 1995, p. A9). The coefficients  on the interaction term 
for portfolios  3-5  are insignificant,  possibly  because  these  banks  hold 
few  swaps. 
To test  whether  the inclusion  of banks with  little or no swap  activity 
affects the coefficients  for the large banks with swaps,  column 4 of Table 
10 presents  the results  of a regression  including  only portfolios  1 and 2. 
The coefficients  are qualitatively  similar to those  in column  3. Compar- 
ing regressions  3 and 4 with  regression  2 indicates  that the inclusion  of 
the  interest-sensitivity  variables  and  the  portfolio  dummies  increases 
predictive  power  by about 22 percentage  points. 
The  net  exposure  of  a bank  from  its  swap  portfolio  to  changes  in 
interest  rates  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  its  swap  portfolio  is 
hedged  and the size of its swap portfolio relative to equity. From Table 8, 
we  know  that  when  interest  rates  rise  by  100 basis  points,  banks  in 
portfolio  1 lose 23% of their equity value from swaps.  Table 10 indicates, 
however,  that this loss is offset by an approximately 21% gain elsewhere 
in the bank's  portfolio,  leaving  a net loss  of 2% of equity, that is,  $800 
million.  Similarly, portfolio  2 loses  47% of 4% of equity,  that is,  2% of 
equity, that is, $2.0 billion. 
7.3  WHOM ARE BANKS TRADING WITH AND  HEDGING WITH? 
On  net,  the  banking  system,  and  specifically,  dealer  banks,  hold  un- 
hedged  positions  in swaps.  This raises two issues.  First, who  takes the 
other  side  of  the  swap  trades? And,  second,  since  banks  are hedging 
their  swap  positions,  whom  are they  hedging  with?  The  answers  to 
these  questions  would  shed  important  light  on  why  the  swap  market 
exists in the form it does. 
With respect to the first question,  the biggest holders of swaps  outside 
of U.S. banks are foreign banks. As shown  in Table 1, many of the largest 
swap  positions  are held  by  non-U.S.  banks.  We do  not  have  enough 
information  to know  whether  the non-U.S.  banks are net long  or short. 
However,  we do know  that some other end users of swaps seem likely to 
prefer long positions  in the swap market. Nonfinancial U.S. corporations 
are said to be candidates  to take long positions  in swaps  (see,  for exam- 
ple,  Swaps Monitor, July 4,  1994,  p.  3).  In addition,  U.S.  government 
agencies,  including  Fannie Mae, Sallie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank of  San  Francisco,  are significant  end  users.  These  agencies  have 336 - GORTON  & ROSEN 
long-term  fixed-rate assets  such as home  mortgages,  making them likely 
to be long  in swaps.  We do not know  whether  it is these  customers  that 
are driving  the net short swap positions  of banks. 
Now  we  turn  to  the  second  question,  who  is  willing  to  take  the 
interest-rate risk from the swap activity that banks are hedging.  Interest- 
rate risk is nondiversifiable,  so if banks are hedging,  then the risk which 
was  transferred  to banks  by  customers  is  somehow  being  repackaged 
and  possibly  sold  back  to  the  same  customers.  If,  in  fact,  the  same 
customers  are buying  back the risk, via futures  market positions,  then 
the reason  for the existence  of the swap  market is economies  of scale or 
scope.  Banks are able to repackage risk in ways  that customers  prefer to 
hold. 
Another  possible  counterparty  for banks  is  foreign  banks.  Some  of 
these  banks  are state-owned  or otherwise  protected  from failure.  This 
means  that risktaking by these  foreign banks may be subsidized  by their 
governments.  This  would  make  them  a  natural  repository  for  any 
nondiversifiable  risk, including  interest-rate risk. Since most of the large 
U.S.  bank swap  dealers  are "too big to fail," it is not clear why  foreign 
banks,  but  not  U.S.  banks,  should  hold  the  residual  interest-rate  risk. 
A remaining  possibility  is that banks' swap  positions  are less  hedged 
than  our regression  results  imply. There are two  ways  that our results 
can overestimate  hedging.  First, if banks underestimate  declines  in the 
market value  of  their  swaps,  perhaps  because  they  underestimate  po- 
tential credit losses,  then  we  will underestimate  the interest-rate sensi- 
tivity  of  their  swap  portfolios  (reports  of  higher-than-expected  credit 
losses  on  derivatives  have  recently  appeared  in the  Wall Street Journal). 
Then,  the  coefficient  on  the interest-rate  sensitivity  term in the regres- 
sions  is underestimated. 
A  second  way  that we  can overestimate  hedging  is if net  income  is 
smoothed  relative  to interest  rates. It is well  known  that banks smooth 
income  (see,  e.g.,  Greenwalt and Sinkey, 1988). Smoothing  would  occur 
if banks underestimated  the unhedged  losses  and gains on derivatives. 
If  smoothing  is  a  major  problem,  then  again  the  coefficient  on  the 
interest-rate  sensitivity  term in the regressions  is underestimated.  Note 
that if this is a problem,  then the recent rise in interest rates might have 
caused  large unreported  losses  at large banks. 
8.  Conclusions 
Assessing  risk requires information.  There is very little publicly available 
information  on  the  swap  positions  of banks.  This means  that it is very 
difficult  to estimate  the  exposure  of banks  to interest-rate  movements. Banks  and  Derivatives  - 337 
Outside  investors  cannot impose  discipline  on banks without  additional 
information.  The information necessary  to better assess  the risks is avail- 
able,  but  not  reported.  This forces investors  and  society  as a whole  to 
rely on bank regulators and examiners.  Regulators and examiners  have 
access  to  the  relevant  information  when  they  monitor  the  derivatives 
positions  of individual  banks.  Unlike regulation  of bank-loan positions, 
there is no inherent  asymmetric  information between  banks and others 
about the risk of swap  positions  (except for concerns  about credit qual- 
ity). This means  that if sufficient  information  were  made  public,  inves- 
tors could assess  risk as accurately as bank insiders and examiners. 
How  much  information  should  banks be required to report publicly? 
We do  not  know.  There are two  issues.  One  is permitting  investors  to 
accurately  estimate  the  market value  of bank  swap  positions  to make 
investment  decisions.  A second  issue  is to assess  systemic  risk in addi- 
tion to individual-institution  risk. Systemic  risk requires looking  at the 
banking  system  as a whole.  What we are concerned  with is the possibil- 
ity that a number  of banks will suffer large losses  on swaps  at the same 
time. At a minimum,  releasing the maturity structure of swaps and other 
derivative  positions  on  a quarterly basis-comparable  to  what  banks 
currently release about on-balance-sheet  activities-would  allow a more 
detailed  estimation  of risk at little cost. 
In this paper, we  are forced to make several assumptions  about matu- 
rity to look at systemic  issues.  With our assumptions,  we calculate mar- 
ket values  and interest-rate sensitivities  of swap positions  in the banking 
industry. We find that the banking system  as a whole,  and dealer banks 
in particular, are exposed  to interest-rate  increases.  However,  we  also 
find that banks seem to have hedged  most of the risk. Our results suggest 
that there should  be little concern about systemic  risk from swaps,  sub- 
ject to the limitations  of our data. 
A  risk that we  are unable  to assess  with  the  publicly  available data 
concerns  short-term  gambles  that banks  take.  Banks attempt  to profit 
from what  they  see as short-term aberrations in market price. To profit, 
banks  take  short-term  speculative  positions  on  specific  interest-rate 
events,  such  as a widening  of the LIBOR-prime  spread.  Banks plan to 
close  these  positions  quickly,  especially  if  the  market  moves  against 
them.  Only  if information  were  released  on  a frequent,  perhaps  daily, 
basis could  these  positions  be monitored  by outsiders.  But it seems  less 
likely  that  these  types  of  strategies  would  contribute  significantly  to 
systemic  risk. If many banks attempt to make the same bet on a specific 
event,  they  will  quickly move  market prices,  eliminating  the perceived 
profit opportunity. 
One  final  concern  is  that  our  conclusions  may  be  premature.  The 338 *  GORTON & ROSEN 
nature  of the  swaps  market might  change,  since  swaps  are a relatively 
new  product.  Swaps  have been  very profitable for dealer banks,  which 
may have mitigated  the incentives  for large banks with entrenched  man- 
agements  to take on risk (see Gorton and Rosen,  1995). Recent problems 
at Bankers Trust suggest  that the industry  may be entering  a new,  less 
profitable  phase.  Since  swaps  are opaque,  regulators  and  others  must 
carefully  monitor  banks  to  insure  that  once  swaps  are  no  longer  as 
profitable,  large dealer banks  do not  begin  to use  them  as vehicles  for 
adding  risk. 
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Because derivative  products  potentially  create a macroeconomic  prob- 
lem,  it is  desirable  to  measure  the  magnitude  of  their  systemic  risks. 
Ideally, if we  outsiders  had  the derivative  book  of the banking  system, 
we could undertake  the same stress tests used by the regulators directly. 
Effectively,  that  is  what  Gorton  and  Rosen  wish  to  do  here.  Unfortu- 
nately,  we  lack the  detailed  data  on  proprietary  derivative  books  and 
bank  stress-testing  machinery.  The data in the  call reports are limited: 
They give  us  only  notional  value  of swap  positions,  replacement  costs, 
and  maturity.  Nevertheless,  employing  a  strong  set  of  assumptions 
about maturity structure and positions,  Gorton and Rosen have cleverly 
used  these  data to estimate  the characteristics of the derivative book and 
stress-test  these  positions.  Then they  ask if capital is adequate  to cover 
the movements  in interest  rates of the  size  that we  have  seen  recently. 
They  find  that  the  value  of  the  swap  book  is  quite  sensitive  to  such 
interest-rate jumps  but that the banks seem to be taking swap positions 
that  hedge  other  interest-rate  mismatches.  Thus,  Gorton  and  Rosen's 
result is reassuring: No obviously  excessive  market risks are being taken, 
even  by the too-large-to-fail  banks. 
This  is  a valuable  contribution,  given  the  informational  vacuum  in 
which  we  outsiders  are forced to work. Naturally, it would  be preferable 
if we could get the "real stuff"-for  example,  if we could get the regula- 
tors to provide  us with  time series of off-balance-sheet  market positions 
of the banks,  or at least to provide us with data on sensitivities  to market 
price movements  generated  by their own  stress  tests.  Then  we  would 
have  a much  more  accurate picture  of the risks in the banking  system 
than can be provided  by techniques  that must paper over large gaps in 
data with  simplifying  assumptions.  To protect proprietary information, 
this could be done  at least for some levels  of aggregation  of the banking 
system. 
In  the  absence  of  such  information,  however,  Gorton  and  Rosen's 
research is the kind of exercise  that we  have to do,  so I read this paper 
with  great interest.  I have  a few  comments  on the technical  aspects  of 
the work, but in general these  remarks will propose  some fine-tuning  of 
their  techniques.  I  will  also  discuss  the  implications  of  Gorton  and 
Rosen's  results  for various  explanations  that have  been  offered  for the 
rapid proliferation of derivative  products. 
2.  The  Calibration  Technique 
In this paper, the key to determining  the market value of a bank's swap 
book from data on replacement  costs is to compute  a set of f "-vectors for 
each  of  the  sixteen  quarterly  observations.  For each  observation,  the Comment 341 
elements  of the f "-vector represent the fractions of new contracts written 
in the period  for the range of possible  maturities.  The authors limit the 
range to five maturities,  with  a maximum  of 5 years.  The calculation of 
market value from replacement  cost also requires knowledge  of the frac- 
tion of new  contracts originated  at a given  date and for a given maturity 
that are long.  Thus  the authors  need  to compute  the l"-vector for each 
period,  with  five elements  representing  the possible  maturities. 
For each  of  the  sixteen  periods,  there are nine  unknowns-the  ele- 
ments  of the fw and  1"  vectors-whose  values  are required to compute 
the  market value  of the  swap  book.  But there are only  three pieces  of 
data: the notional  value  of outstanding  contracts, replacement  cost, and 
the fraction of notional value represented  by contracts with less than one 
year until maturity. 
To circumvent  this lack of identifying  information,  Gorton and Rosen 
assume  that the f  and  l" vectors  are fixed parameters across observa- 
tions.  This is a strong  assumption-that  subsets  of the banking  system 
always  contract  a  fixed  fraction  of  business  at  a  given  maturity  and 
always  take  the  same  long  or short  position  at a given  maturity. The 
authors  argue  that  this  assumption  is  most  palatable for the  banking 
sector taken as a whole:  If the position  and maturity requirements of the 
end  users  are relatively  unchanging,  so will be the characteristics of the 
swap  product provided  by the banking sector. 
To continue  a little further with  the construction  of the f  and 1"  vec- 
tors,  the  authors'  calibration technique  involves  starting with  an arbi- 
trary pattern of the f "-vector, restricted only by the requirement to match 
the data on the fraction of notional amounts  outstanding  of less than one 
year in maturity. Given  the f  -vector, the authors compute  the amounts 
of  new  contracts  in  each  period,  and  then  calculate  the  l"-vector by 
quadratic programming,  minimizing  the deviation  of RC* from the right 
side of equation  (16) subject to the elements  of I/being  between  zero and 
one.  This procedure is necessary  because the assumption  that the f W and 
l" vectors  are constant  has overidentified  the system. 
As an alternative methodology,  suppose  that we choose  the pattern of 
the l"-vector arbitrarily. Then we  can back out the f  -vector in a similar 
quadratic programming  exercise.  For the final calibration of the f W  and 1" 
vectors,  it should  not matter that we start with an arbitrary  f 
W or 1W  vector. 
That raises  the  question:  Starting with  the  /"-vector generated  by  the 
authors'  technique,  would  application  of quadratic programming  yield 
the arbitrary f  -vector with which  they started? Alternatively  stated,  are 
the  f"  and  1" vectors  produced  by  Gorton  and  Rosen  a  fixed  point  of 
applying  these  alternative  calibration  methods  in  sequence?  If  not, 
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a fixed point? Are there multiple  fixed points? Finally, and most impor- 
tantly, will the lack of a fixed point  cause  us to miscalculate  the interest 
sensitivity  of the banks' swap book? 
3.  Why Are There  So Many Derivatives? 
Gorton  and  Rosen  conclude  that banks  are taking interest-rate  risk in 
their swap book.  Nevertheless,  because  the market value of bank equity 
did  not  decline  significantly  following  rises  in interest  rates,  they  also 
conclude  that the unbalanced  positions  in the swap book must be offset 
by opposite  mismatches  in on-balance-sheet  lending  and securities hold- 
ing.  If this conclusion  is robust,  it adds to the conundrum  of why  over- 
the-counter  derivatives  markets have expanded  so rapidly. 
To explain  the large-scale  use  of derivatives,  we  can tell stories about 
how  they permit the rapid reallocation of the risks of market price move- 
ments,  but we  lack a convincing  explanation  of why  securities  markets 
cannot  do  the  same  job.  Particularly problematic is the use  of interest- 
rate swaps.  The  standard  argument  is that there are gains  from trade 
between  fixed-rate  and floating-rate  payers  that are unexploited  by the 
markets  for short-term  and long-term  securities.  This argument  can be 
carried  through  if  we  presume  that  floating-rate  payers  know  more 
about the market than do other lenders; but because  the firms engaged 
heavily  in the use of interest-rate swaps  are credit-rated corporates with 
access  to  securities  markets,  this  story  does  not  bear up  well,  even  if 
banks are the principal counterparties. 
A more logical alternative is that the market is fostered by too-large-to- 
fail banks  engaged  in underpricing  risk and avoiding  on-balance-sheet 
capital requirements  while  free-riding on the financial safety net.  Banks 
benefit  both  from  the  lower  capital requirements  on  off-balance-sheet 
positions  and from the additional  opacity that the derivative book lends 
to  their  overall  position  vis-a-vis  market  risk.  However,  the  authors' 
conclusion  that the  too-large-to-fail  U.S.  banks are well  hedged  under- 
mines  this explanation. 
If banks  do not bear market risk, it must be borne by end  users  who 
want  to carry it in the form of derivative  products.  Portfolio managers 
may  want  to  carry yield-enhancing  derivatives  to  get  a leg  up  on  the 
benchmarks  while  remaining  within  the  restrictions  imposed  by  their 
prospectuses.  Derivatives  provide  a  method  for  generating  increased 
yield  that is opaque  to both  shareholders  and senior management.  Re- 
cent debacles  to end users of leveraged  derivative products  suggest  that 
such  obscure  forms  of yield  enhancement  have  been  a major source  of 
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In this regard,  it is instructive  to consider  the losses  to the holders  of 
"toxic waste"  by-products  of  mortgage-backed  securities.  These  losses 
have  eliminated  the  demand  for such  risky products  and  thereby  de- 
pressed  the  market  even  for the  lower-risk  securities  generated  from 
such  pools.  This leads  to a hypothesis  that the toxic-waste  components 
of derivatives  are those  in demand  and those  that generate  the profits; 
the low-risk  securities  produced  in the process of generating  toxic waste 
are the by-products  of the process.  A slight underpricing  to dispose  of 
the  low-risk  by-products  would  allow  them  to dominate  the  standard 
securities  markets.  If the demand  for toxic waste  were  to dry up,  how- 
ever, so would  the supply  of low-risk products,  as has recently occurred 
in the mortgage-backed  securities  market. 
The rise of mutual  funds  and pension  funds-operated  by managers 
compensated  on the basis of yield performance relative to a benchmark- 
provides  a growing  demand  for risk-enhancing  devices.  Derivative prod- 
ucts,  which  are generally  not  understood  by  shareholders  and  senior 
management,  satisfy this demand.  By means of these products,  interest- 
rate risk, which  had  resided  in the on-balance-sheet  activities  of banks 
due to the financial safety net, now can be channeled into the pension  and 
mutual funds. 
Comment1 
GREG  DUFFEE 
Federal Reserve Board 
1. Introduction 
The authors attempt to answer two questions  using bank call-report data. 
First, how exposed  to fluctuations  in interest rates is the banking sector's 
interest-rate swap book? Second,  to what extent is this swap book hedged 
by banks? Before discussing  these questions  in detail, I should  note that, 
owing  to a dearth of publicly available data, the task the authors are taking 
on is very difficult. Indeed,  a standard view is that existing public data are 
wholly  inadequate  to determine  the risk-taking behavior of banks.  See, 
for example,  the discussions  in the Fisher Report (Euro-currency Standing 
Committee  Working Group, 1994) and Moody's (1994). Hence while I will 
question  the paper's  success  in answering  these  questions,  this is not a 
failing of the authors,  but rather of the data. 
1. The  analysis  and  conclusions  in  this  comment  are  those  of  the  author  and  do  not 
indicate concurrence  by other members of the research staff, by the Board of Governors, 
or by the Federal Reserve Banks. 
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2. How  Risky  Are  Banks'  Swap  Books? 
Given  enough  assumptions  about interest-rate  swap  replacement  costs 
and  maturity  structure,  as  well  as  the  stability  of banks'  positions  in 
these swaps,  the authors are able to construct the interest-rate sensitivity 
of  the  banking  sector's  interest-rate  swap  book.  One  interpretation  of 
this effort is that the authors  are taking the steps  necessary  to estimate 
this  sensitivity  with  call-report data.  Another  interpretation  is that the 
authors  are showing  us  how  much  we  don't  know,  but need  to know, 
about banks' trading behavior in order to extract useful information from 
the data in bank call reports. 
This is not to say that the authors do a poor job of estimating the interest 
sensitivity  of swaps.  If I were forced to use call-report data to estimate this 
sensitivity,  I'd use  their approach.  Unfortunately,  we  don't  know  how 
confident  to be in their estimates,  because we don't know the sensitivity 
of the authors' estimates  to variations in most of their assumptions.  There 
are, however,  two pieces  of evidence  that suggest  these  sensitivities  are 
high.  First,  their  Table 6 reports  that  changing  the  assumed  maturity 
structure of new contracts from U-shaped to flat (holding all other assump- 
tions constant) results in a 50-fold increase in calculated interest sensitiv- 
ity. Second,  raising the assumed  fraction of swaps with less than a year to 
maturity from roughly  33% (the mean value used  in their paper) to 50% 
(the value  used  in an earlier version  of this paper) increases  the interest 
sensitivity  by a factor of 3. 
Two assumptions  that are particularly weak,  but very  hard to relax, 
are  the  assumed  stability  over  time  of  banks'  positions  and  maturity 
structure.  Swaps Monitor uses  annual  reports  and  SEC filings  to  esti- 
mate  the  interest-rate  swap  positions  of  end  users  (i.e.,  those  taking 
the  opposite  side  of  dealer  banks'  positions).  They  estimate  that  in 
1991, end  users  paid  fixed,  or were  long,  on  60% of their interest  rate 
swaps;  by 1993, this figure had fallen to 38%. In other words,  there has 
been  a large  shift  in end-user  positions  out  of long  contracts and into 
short  contracts,  suggestive  of  a  corresponding  reduction  in  dealer 
banks'  net  short  position  over  time.  The average  maturity  of interest- 
rate swaps  is widely  believed  to have fallen over time as well,  although 
I am unable  to find any recent data that document  the strength  of this 
pattern. 
However,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  assume  that  the  authors  have 
correctly  calculated  the  interest  sensitivity  of banks'  swap  books.  The 
authors  then ask whether  this sensitivity  is hedged  elsewhere  in banks' 
books. Comment 345 
3. Are  Banks'  Interest-Rate  Swap  Books  Hedged? 
Depending  on  how  we  interpret this question,  the answer  may or may 
not be meaningful.  Banks do not manage their risks instrument by instru- 
ment;  they  focus  on  the  risk of their overall profit or loss.  The mix of 
instruments  used by banks to attain their desired risk profile depends  on 
the relative costs of transacting in the instruments. 
One relevant question  is whether  banks use interest-rate swaps  as one 
of  the  tools  to  reach  their desired  sensitivity  of net  income  to interest 
rates. It is clear from a reading of column  1 in Table 10 that banks do not 
use  interest-rate  swaps  in this way  (although  the authors  do not point 
this  out).  This  regression  indicates  that banks'  net  income  rises  when 
interest  rates  rise,  a relation  that is presumably  chosen  by  the  banks. 
This  overall  relation  is  opposite  the  relation  that the  authors  find  be- 
tween  banks' swap  values  and interest rates. The authors' maturity-gap 
analysis  corroborates  this  evidence.  Hence,  subject  to  the  caveat  that 
economic  income  and accounting  income  can differ, other factors (such 
as capturing  the  swap  bid-ask  spread)  are driving  banks'  positions  in 
the swap  market. 
The authors are asking a different question with their regression analy- 
sis. They want to know  whether  there are specific banking activities that 
offset  the interest-rate  swap  positions.  This question,  as formalized  by 
their regressions,  is: To what extent is the time variation in the sensitivity 
of swap income to interest rates matched by time variation in the sensitiv- 
ity of net income  to interest rates? 
Note  that the sensitivity  of banks' swap income  to changes  in interest 
rates is not constant  over time, largely because  the notional  principal of 
interest-rate  swap  books  varies over time.  This sensitivity  can be calcu- 
lated  given  the  authors'  assumptions  about  the  changing  structure  of 
banks' swap books  over time. The authors' regressions  test whether  this 
calculated sensitivity  helps  explain variations over time in the sensitivity 
of net income  to interest rates. At one extreme, if there were no explana- 
tory power,  the authors would  conclude  that banks' swap books must be 
completely  hedged  elsewhere  in banks' portfolios.  At the other extreme, 
if the sensitivity  of net income  moved  in lockstep  with the sensitivity  of 
swap income,  the authors would  conclude  that banks' swap books must 
be  unhedged.  They  find  that  overall,  banks'  swap  books  are largely 
hedged. 
However,  it is not  clear what  this result tells us about the risks that 
banks  take with  interest-rate  swaps.  Consider  a hypothetical  bank that 
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and  changes  in interest  rates.  This negative  relation is achieved  with  a 
mixture  of swaps  and  futures,  with  the mixture varying  over time,  de- 
pending  on the relative  costs  of transacting in the two  markets.  By the 
authors'  criteria, the bank's  interest-rate  swap  book  would  be hedged, 
since the variation over time in the sensitivity  of swap income would  not 
be  accompanied  by  any  variation  over  time  in  the  sensitivity  of  net 
income.  Yet a reasonable interpretation of this hypothetical bank's activi- 
ties is that it does  not hedge  its swap  positions,  but in fact uses  them to 
speculate. 
4.  What  Do These  Results  Mean? 
The authors are primarily interested  in systemic-risk issues.  In my view, 
the  important  issues  can  be  summarized  in  two  questions.  First,  are 
banks using  derivative  instruments  to take on excessive  risks? Second,  if 
they  are doing  so,  is there  some  government  policy  (perhaps  changing 
the regulation  of derivative  markets and/or of banks) that would  reduce 
these  excessive  risks in a cost-effective  manner? The biggest problem the 
authors face in addressing  these questions  is that they only have data on 
interest-rate swaps.  Banks are involved  in other derivative activities that 
are very  sensitive  to interest  rates,  such as interest-rate forwards,  caps, 
floors,  and futures.  They are also big players in foreign-exchange,  com- 
modity,  and equity derivative  markets. 
Moreover,  positions  in over-the-counter  derivative  instruments,  such 
as  interest-rate  swaps,  tend  to  be  driven  by  customer  demand,  and 
therefore  tell us  little about banks'  overall risk profiles.  Firms typically 
adjust  their  risk profiles  in  futures  markets.  For example,  commercial 
banks  (trading for their own  accounts)  are often among  the institutions 
with  the largest open  positions  in interest-rate futures markets. 
Even  if we  abstract from these  data problems,  "snapshots"  of  posi- 
tions  and partial derivatives  are, by themselves,  unlikely  to answer  the 
important  questions  concerning  systemic  risk. In order to answer  these 
questions,  we  need  to know  banks' reaction functions  to changing  eco- 
nomic  conditions  (both their own  economic  health  and the state of the 
economy  at large). The assumption  that banks do not adjust their portfo- 
lios in reaction to new  information is both empirically false and theoreti- 
cally weak.  If banks  systematically  reduce their risks as their net assets 
fall (perhaps  in  response  to regulatory  prodding),  risktaking behavior 
that  is  large  on  average  need  not  be  excessive.  Conversely,  if banks 
systematically  increase their risks as their net assets fall, banks are taking 
excessive  risks even  if their risktaking is very low on average. 
From a policy  perspective,  even  full  knowledge  of banks'  positions Discussion 347 
and  reaction  functions  may  be  insufficient,  because  banks  will  adjust 
their behavior  in response  to government  policies.  Banks choose  their 
desired  overall risk profile, but not the risk profile of any particular class 
of  assets.  Therefore  the  contribution  of  any  particular set  of  financial 
instruments  to the variance of bank profitability is endogenous,  and to 
some extent arbitrary.  Hence regulatory restrictions on one type of instru- 
ment will be ineffective  as long as banks can shift their risktaking behav- 
ior to another type of instrument.  For example, banks can take very large 
bets  on  interest  rates in the repo  (cash) market for Treasury securities. 
But if the  allocation  of risks in banks'  portfolios  is arbitrary, why  is 
there so much attention  paid to banks' derivatives activities? The reason 
is that investors  and regulators are concerned  that banks may take risks 
with  derivatives  that cannot be observed  by outsiders  until it is too late. 
In other words,  the problem is not that the volatility of banks' derivative 
positions  is high,  but that outsiders  don't really know what this volatility 
is.  As  the  authors  point  out,  if  risktaking  is  unobserved,  it  may  be 
optimal  for  banks  to  take  on  risks  that  are  excessive  even  from  the 
perspective  of stockholders,  let alone regulators.  This opacity is behind 
the push  by investors  and regulators  for increased  disclosure  of banks' 
market risks. 
In response  to this push  (formalized  in accounting  standards  such as 
FAS 107 and 119), banks are making public more information about their 
derivative  activities.  They are also revealing  certain private information 
to the rating agencies.  As the authors mention,  additional information is 
now collected  on call reports, although  for the dealer banks, on-site bank 
examinations  are a much  more important  regulatory  tool than are call- 
report data. Even the enhanced  call-report data (let alone those analyzed 
by the authors) are insufficient,  by themselves,  to address the important 
questions  concerning  systemic  risk. 
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useful information,  and that, under the assumption that the swap indus- 
try is in a steady state, Gorton and Rosen's approach  at least provides a 
first pass at evaluating the systemic risk associated with banks' deriva- 
tives activity. Richard Rosen added that the important question was 
whether banks were hedged overall, not whether the banks had big or 
small swap positions; hence, even if different  assumptions led to differ- 
ent estimates of swap positions, the hedging regression would remain 
valid. Martin  Feldstein agreed that the important  question was the net 
exposure and not just the swap exposure per se. 
Feldstein also pointed out that the authors  focus solely on interest-rate 
risk while ignoring counterparty  risk. He argued that adding credit risk 
to their framework would increase the overall level of riskiness of the 
banks' positions in the derivatives  markets.  Ben Bernanke  noted that in 
most derivatives markets there were clearing houses to guarantee the 
counterparty  and asked why there were no clearing  houses bearing the 
credit  risk of interest-rate  swaps. Gorton  suggested that, in some scenar- 
ios, the lack of margin requirements  and marking to market in swaps 
might be the source of their appeal to traders. 
Several  participants  emphasized the need for more disclosure  of infor- 
mation on banks' derivatives  positions. Feldstein  noted that more infor- 
mation is currently becoming available and that the new  disclosures 
generally support the authors'  finding that the banks  are not taking  large 
risks, relative to the size of their assets and capital. Rosen agreed that 
more data had started to become available  recently,  but suggested that 
there was not yet enough information to permit significant improve- 
ments  in  their  estimates.  Bob Hall  argued  that  the  real question  was 
what  the  disclosure  requirements  ought  to be; ideally  information  re- 
leased by public corporations  (including  banks)  should facilitate  investor 
decision making. Since banks happen to be insured by the public, they 
should be required to give the public information  on the risks they are 
taking. Another reason for releasing  information  about  banks'  risks, Hall 
suggested,  was to help guarantee a risk-free payments  system.  Contrary 
to the  claims  of several  participants,  Hall argued  that the  current pay- 
ments  system  is  not  truly  instantaneous,  so  that  the  Fed bears  some 
residual credit risk. 
Julio  Rotemberg  asked what position banks had generally  taken in the 
recent instances  in which they had lost money in swaps.  Rosen answered 
that in general,  regional  banks had been  in a short position,  betting  on 
interest  rates either remaining  constant  or continuing  to decline. 
Steve Cecchetti stressed  the importance to the authors' results of their 
assumption  of a constant  term structure of contracts,  both  in absolute 
levels  and over  time.  He argued  that, in general,  banks would  want  to Discussion 349 
change  both the maturities and net positions  of their hedges  as financial 
conditions  change.  Gorton replied that their model  was constructed  not 
for an  individual  bank  but  for  the  entire  banking  industry:  While  an 
individual  bank  may  change  its positions  rapidly, the  assumption  that 
the  industry  as a whole  would  maintain  a constant  maturity structure 
and  mix of short and  long  positions  is not  so unreasonable.  He added 
that their  model  allowed  them  to perform any  experiment  concerning 
the interest  sensitivity  of the market value,  given  a set of assumptions 
about  the  term structure.  Duffee  suggested  that the maturity structure 
had been  shortening  over time. 
Bob Hall suggested  that the volume  of swap  trade is very difficult to 
explain,  unless  the vast majority of trades are sales of "snake oil." Gor- 
ton said that when  the swap market first developed,  people  argued that 
they  created  an  opportunity  for  trade  among  customers  of  different 
credit quality. But he noted  the likely importance of the agency  problem 
which  arises  from  the  performance-linked  compensation  contracts  of 
money  managers. 
Martin Feldstein characterized bank risk management  as the writing of 
a big variance-covariance  matrix of potential assets,  followed  by a com- 
putation  of the  earnings  variability associated  with  different  positions. 
Gorton noted  that this approach would  help banks project the effects of 
a 100- or 200-basis-point  movement  in interest  rates. Duffee  took issue 
with  this view  of risk management.  He argued that this static approach 
was  better  described  as  risk  measurement, while  risk  management was 
inherently  unobservable  by accounting  mechanisms.  Risk management 
pertains  to  the  banks'  reaction  functions:  How  do  banks  adjust  their 
portfolios  as interest  rates begin  to move?  Do they close  their positions 
very  quickly  or do  they  keep  them  open? Duffee  stressed  that the Fed 
worries about both the reaction functions  of banks as well as their expo- 
sure to risk in a more static sense. 